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Preface 
 
As an artist I have ideas about my discernments concerning the world, about myself as 
an artist, and about art as an establishment. Having experience of the world around 
me and the peculiarities of humankind’s systemisations and formulaic tendencies I 
believe that there is no predetermination to our existence. The view that there is not 
predetermination brings into question the significance and value assigned to art. The 
dissertation explores aspects of how I see my existence in relation to my existence as 
an artist. The artist, Bruce Nauman and his work in the 1960s, is fundamental to this 
research. However, the various other artists discussed here have all played a major 
role in the development of my understanding that the absurd is a necessary 
conceptual tool in the expressions of art. Investigating significance within an art 
establishment and the value therein is imperative to the study. My research, 
demonstrated in the exhibition Neither Art Nor Art (2016), explores related notions of 
the absurd and significance and value in art. 
 
Neither Art Nor Art (2016) is documented in a catalogue that will assist in the reading 
and greater understanding of the hypotheses discussed in the dissertation. The 
Introduction (Chapter One) and the Literature Review (Chapter Two) investigates the 
notion of the absurd as found in the discipline of philosophy and language, 
predominantly based on Existentialism, and reflects on specific propositions of 
significance and value. This is done to underpin the existing theories surrounding the 
research and to assist the reader in identifying those theories’ underlying networks 
throughout the dissertation. Chapter Three identifies these theories as they pertain to 
the work of Nauman as compared to a Duchampian way of being. These three 
chapters further inform Chapter Four on my own approach and methodologies to 
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making art and my state of mind regarding my existence and significance within an art 
establishment. In the Conclusion I connect back to the introduction and the aims of the 
research to validate findings that I originally set out to achieve. 
 
In both the dissertation and exhibition the wealth of experience, discipline and 
dedication from both my Supervisor, Doctor Gwenneth Miller and Co-Supervisor Celia 
de Villiers is immeasurable. I am extremely grateful to them for their unwavering 
support and guidance throughout my degree. Without their patience and willingness to 
assist me this project would not have been possible. A debt of gratitude goes to Mark 
Fegen for his expertise and commitment in helping me in the making of the sculptures, 
videos, and photographs and for the setting up of Neither Art Nor Art (2016). Your 
shared vision and tireless dedication will not be forgotten. Thank you to Ciara Struwig 
and Manu Manjesh Lal for assisting with the installation of work at the exhibition. 
Thanks must go to Sita Suzanne (Moyo) for her assistance with the exhibition 
catalogue. 
 
Thank you to the University of South Africa for support, bursaries and the use of the 
UNISA gallery for the exhibition space. To the staff at the UNISA Gallery, in particular, 
Bongani Mkhonza, Jacob Lebeko, Simangele Sithole, Zingisa Nkosinkulu, and Lucky 
Khuzwayo, I extend my gratitude for all their assistance with equipment, promotions, 
installing, and dismantling of the exhibition. 
 
A special thanks must go to my wife Yolandi Coetser for her believing in me, for her 
constant encouragement and her expertise and advice with writing and research. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
The title of this dissertation, Bruce Nauman: The True Artist is an Absurd Fountain is a 
parody on The True Artist is an Amazing Luminous Fountain (Window or Wall Shade) 
(1966) (fig 1) by Bruce Nauman. The dissertation title accentuates the dialogue within 
the concepts located in many of Nauman’s artworks. The statement that a ‘true artist’ 
is an absurd fountain explicates the idea that a legitimate (‘true’) artist will inevitably 
create artworks with a degree of absurdity. It argues that such absurdity offers a critical 
view of society through the subversive character of the artist. The absurdity discussed 
pertains to existentialism and is applied to Nauman’s use of visual and literary 
references. The intention is to probe the stance that the valuable and the significant - 
that which society subconsciously accepts and adopts as conventional (everyday) 
behaviour – is situated in the absurd (Nagel 1971:717). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1. Bruce Nauman, The True Artist Is an 
Amazing Luminous Fountain (Window or 
Wall Shade) (1966) 
 
Fig 2. Bruce Nauman, Drawing for 
The True Artist is an Amazing 
Luminous Fountain (Window or Wall 
Shade) (1966) 
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The title suggests that the artist is a fountain. The metaphorical comparison refers to 
the importance of the artist’s practice – the giving forth of something significant, 
sustainable and even essential. However, the fountain is an object that, although 
animated, is not living. By referring to the fountain as an absurd metaphor, it 
emphasises the paradoxical nature of art. According to Tony Godfrey (1998:4) in his 
book Conceptual Art (1998) art is given status and is “something that we should 
admire and respect”. At the same time, Godfrey (1998:4) states that the artwork – as a 
‘sacred object’ – “is something that conceptual artists have seized in glee [to] be an 
outright denouncement of the institution [of art]” (Godfrey 1998:4). 
 
1.1 RATIONALE OF THE STUDY 
 
Disruption as a paradigm is of particular interest in Nauman’s work. His conceptual 
thinking unsettled modernist notions of art in the 1960s (Tomkins 2009). This 
dissertation addresses the notions of ‘value’ and ‘significance’ in art, as well as how 
human behaviour is confronted by Nauman (particularly in the 1960s), and it builds on 
the strength of such critical disruption. The disruption that Nauman caused was not in 
isolation but corresponded with other conceptual theorists of his time. For example, 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and Arthur C. Danto both engage with theories relating to the way 
we think about language and art. Tony Godfrey (1998:125 and 100) says that 
Wittgenstein elicits language to disrupt a logical rationalisation of the world around us, 
and Danto refers to conceptual thinking in art as “a concerted attack on tradition” 
(Godfrey 1998:100). 
 
Personal understanding and engagement with Nauman’s artworks have been prolific 
in my practice and my interactions and engagements with the art establishment over 
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many years. Therefore it has formed a foundation for continued research. For brevity, I 
focus almost exclusively on Nauman’s fountain artworks, occasionally referring to 
other representations such as The True Artist Helps the World by Revealing Mystic 
Truths (1967) (fig 3) only to corroborate my stance.  
 
 
 
 
 
Comparisons are made to other artworks that allude to the nature of fountains or the 
use of elements of the absurd and repetitious behaviour to justify the absurd as a 
conceptual device in the making of artworks. Some of these examples that are 
compared to Nauman are Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain (1917) (fig 4), Alexander 
Calder’s Mercury Fountain (1937) (fig 5), and Michael Craig-Martin’s An Oak Tree 
(1973) (fig 6). Referencing other artworks substantiates the rationale that art, and by 
extension, the artist, can be measured for value, but can simultaneously enforce a 
sense of purposelessness in art through the inclusion of the absurd and the 
Fig 3. Bruce Nauman, The True Artist Helps the World 
by Revealing Mystic Truths (1967) 
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paradoxical. Therefore, the dissertation also examines the concept and role of the ‘true 
artists’ and the implied meanings that Nauman expresses. The absurd is an 
unavoidable fact of our existence (Sartre 1938:68, Camus 1955:69) and is investigated 
and proposed as being the ‘true’ that Nauman refers to in his work. The ‘true’ is 
investigated under the assumption that legitimacy is dependent on the authority of an 
‘artworld’, or art establishment1 and its forces (Danto 1964:571). The fountain provides 
the metaphor for the argument that the absurd is an unavoidable fact of our existence 
that resurfaces perpetually in art. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 I make use of the term ‘art establishment’ throughout this dissertation. It refers to a 
community within the discipline of visual arts and encompasses museums, galleries, art events, 
institutions of research, academia, as well as the media, critics, the art lover, the art viewer, and 
the artist. The ‘art establishment’ is synonymous with what George Dickie (1984:9) defines as 
the ‘artworld’, which is not a “formally organised body [but,] consists of individual systems 
[made up by] a totality of roles… of artist and public at its core” (Dickie 1984:75). (See also 
Danto’s The Artworld here, ttp://faculty.georgetown.edu/irvinem/visualarts/Danto-Artworld.pdf) 
Fig 4. Marcel Duchamp, Fountain (1917) 
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(Please see the full text from Michael Craig-Martin’s An Oak Tree [1973] [fig 6] on the following 
page) 
 
  
Fig 5. Alexander Calder, Mercury Fountain (1937) 
Fig 6. Michael Craig Martin, An Oak Tree (1973) 
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Fig 7. Michael Craig-Martin, An Oak Tree (Text Detail) (1973) 
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1.2 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM  
 
I trace the roots of western conceptualism in the context of its opposition to ‘retinal 
pleasure’*, to Duchamp, when the status quo of cultural values was in question 
(Godfrey 1998:6). In the mid-1960s the role of the artist as a critic who challenges 
societal behaviour also demystified the significance of the ‘talent’ of the artist. In other 
words, the notion of the artist as a master of his skills was in question as the role of the 
reader (viewer) became as important as the author’s2 (artist) in how meaning was 
made (Godfrey 1998:139). As Danto (2005:11) enquired into the relevance of ‘beauty’ 
as a measure of aesthetic significance, “the replacement of an aesthetics of forms with 
an aesthetics of meaning” leaves the responsibility of making meaning in the minds of 
the viewer and not the honed skills of the artist. Here a question of how much 
involvement in the skillful making of the work is necessary for the result to be ‘true’ art 
and, therefore, questions the role of the ‘true artist’ (to use Nauman’s description - see 
fig 1. and fig 2.). The Dada movement rejected conventional aesthetics because 
evoking ‘disgust’ was an effective way to get the viewer to contemplate the calamities 
of war (Danto 2007:1). This drive of the anti-aesthetic disseminated after Dadaism into 
forthcoming manifestations of art leading up to the 1960s and 1970s. Minimalism, for 
example, attempted ridding the artwork of ‘representational imagery’ and evidence of 
the ‘artist’s touch’ (Atkins 1997:116). Arte Povera often made careful considerations of 
‘cast-off’ materials and how these would ‘clash’ with selected environments to evoke 
aesthetic meaning within “the geographical or sociological terrain” (Atkins 1997:51). 
The value attached to the artwork within these movements was therefore determined 
                                                          
2 The primary source of this concept comes from the French literary critic, Roland Barthes, 
(1989:54) who proposes that “writing ceaselessly posits meaning but always in order to 
evaporate it: it proceeds to a systematic exemption of meaning. The unity of a text is not in its 
origin, it is in its destination; but this destination can no longer be personal: the reader is a man 
[sic] without history, without biography, without psychology; he is only that someone who holds 
gathered into a single field all the paths of which the text is constituted”. 
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by a critical challenge presented by the artist and the viewer’s engagements, and not 
to the craftsmanship or skill of the artist (Godfrey 1998:4, 6). 
 
Nauman, and others like him3, viewed making art as an embodied endeavour. His own 
body became a medium, embedded in and represented through other mediums such 
as photography, film or text based work (Lewallen 2007:101). For Nauman, the 
fountain signifies the functionality of the artist within the correct contextual 
establishment. The fountain is to water what the artist is to art. His body becomes an 
instrument in art and is metaphorically represented as such by mimicking the 
behaviour of a fountain, a symbol of a source of life-sustenance. This embodiment is 
one of meaning and carries with it a reflection of how the body, in proximity to other 
bodies or objects, becomes a tool that sparks contemplation and re-evaluation. It 
elicits in the viewer a motivation to make meaning. Nauman’s reasoning about art 
extends beyond the tradition that an artist is a skilled and trained artisan who would 
make art as a profession to the assessment of an artist as someone who is always an 
artist even when not making self-portraits or other representational art4. Being a ‘true 
artist’ is thus a way of being, rather than just an activity or occupation. Frank Owen 
(2014:26) says of Nauman that “[s]omewhere in there, he began thinking of his own 
body’s vertical centreline as the axis of his evolving and revolving universe of 
situations and ideas” (Owen cited in Plagens 2014:26). The ‘true artist’ in Nauman’s 
context, or the ‘artist’s truth’, is ‘made’ in activity – free from the claims to ‘truths’ 
                                                          
3 In the 1960s artists such as; Yves Klein, with his imprints of the female body onto canvases; 
Allan Kaprow, with his ‘Happenings’; and Joseph Beuys, with works such as Explaining 
Pictures to a Dead Hare (1965), were some key figures who appropriated the body (of the 
artist, participant, or audience/viewer) in various ways in their artworks (Atkins 1997:42 and 74). 
4 Joseph Buys believed that the artist was not only so by profession in a traditional sense, but 
that the role of the artist was to benefit and to ‘heal’ a society. Although he saw that art 
originated from personal experiences it simultaneously addresses universal political and social 
ideas. His work and his contributions “suggest the healing potential of art for a humanity 
seeking self-revitalization and a sense of renewed hope in the future” (Wolf 2014). Like 
Nauman, Beuys believed that art is not so much a ‘specialised profession’, but more so a 
‘heightened humanitarian attitude’, a way of being that filters into all aspects of life (Wolf 2014). 
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‘found’ within the art establishment (Rorty 1989:7). Truth is a core concept that is 
discussed further in the introduction of the Literature Review (Chapter Two) as it 
pertains to this dissertation. The research problem, therefore, engages with the identity 
of the artist as a critical voice, the body of the artist as a functioning ‘tool’ and the 
artist’s way of truthful being, within a prodigious art establishment. 
 
1.3 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND AIMS 
 
The aim of this research is to identify Nauman’s criticality through careful analyses of 
the texts about his work. As aforementioned, I intend to examine the influences on 
Nauman’s reasoning, specifically through the literature on Duchamp’s use of 
paradoxes, puns and non-art objects, and Wittgenstein’s use of linguistic 
arrangements that straddle the line between logic and the irrational. I refer to Albert 
Camus, Jean-Paul Sartre, and to a lesser extent, Martin Heidegger to substantiate the 
argument of the significance of the absurd in art. Having gained insight into Nauman’s 
work, I apply and expand on visual expressions by showing how my artworks are 
influenced by Nauman and his ideas. His influence is shown through my body 
representing an artist in artworks; through the use of actions, such as repeated 
climbing or ‘hiding’; and the use of symbols, such as a plinth, a ladder or a fountain. 
The insights into Nauman’s approaches and methodologies are therefore applied as a 
lens through which to examine and assess my work. 
 
The research objective informs my practice to establish that the absurd is a conceptual 
crux and is applied to formal principles of sculpture, photography, and performances. 
When looking at my artwork, I come to realise that being an artist is being incongruent. 
There is self-awareness at play, and the ambiguities of my past have naturally 
influenced how I observe and interact with institutions such as art, with ‘truths’, with 
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successes and failures, and these observations play a significant role in my creative 
processes. 
 
As Nauman’s work is commenting on Duchamp’s practices and understandings of the 
absurd and paradoxical nature of art, so too my work comments further on Nauman’s 
ideas in this regard. The one is an extension of the other. In the Performing Arts 
Journal John Howell (1977:28) states in an article called ‘Art Performance: New York’, 
that “Nauman's early works appear to be a series of footnotes to Duchamp's thesis, 
using puns”. I take note of this approach, and the title of this dissertation enacts this 
strategy with reference to Nauman. The visual and literary associations made by the 
use of puns aims to set up an enigmatic reading of an artwork and through this, the 
objective is to form a dialectic with Duchamp and Nauman. 
 
Wittgenstein, although not an existentialist, emphasises language and how we use 
words, becoming absurd often confounding in our understanding of the world around 
us (Lewallen 2007:42). Although a rational use of language defines the natural world 
the way in which we apply it can create unusual and confusing perspectives even as it 
remains logical. Accentuating this in the process of defining absurdity and how it 
relates to Nauman’s practice endeavours to clarify my stance regarding language, in 
the visual and the literary formats. The literary rendition, such as the title of an artwork, 
is often repetitious of the visual, and vice versa, creating a back and forth or a cycle – 
at times a mere descriptive of the visual. I elaborate on this in my comparison between 
Nauman and Duchamp to further justify the applicable philosophical investigation. 
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1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The questions, which structure my research flow from the title Bruce Nauman: The 
True Artist is an Absurd Fountain, are as follows:  
 The first question: Which theoretical influences have informed Nauman’s 
criticality towards social constructs and the art establishment? In turn what has 
informed my critical viewpoint regarding the ‘true’ and the absurd?  
 The second question: How do Nauman’s fountains specifically illustrate his 
understanding of art and the artist as incongruous? This question expands to 
ask: What is the role of the fountain in the context of a fundamentally absurd 
worldview and in which way is the body used to represent this? 
 
1.5 THE SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The scope of this dissertation lies in the establishment of Nauman’s conceptual 
framework, not because others have failed to establish a conceptual context that is 
true to Nauman, but rather to establish a conjectural agenda as it relates to my 
experience and understanding of his conventions. Fountains emphasise that actions 
are repeatable, that behaviour is cyclical and speak of activity, process, beginnings 
and ends, but also represent a regurgitation of the same elements over and over. The 
fountain is a significant symbol in conceptual art, because of the vast history of 
fountains and the relationship they have to art. There are publications, spanning nearly 
five decades, where numerous authors have given valuable contextual reasoning and 
antithesis for Nauman’s work. The authors are, amongst others, Marcia Tucker (1970); 
Thomas Albright (1985); Brook Adams (1990); Neil Benezra (1993); as well as Danto 
and Godfrey (1990s and 2000s); and more recently, Philip Larratt-Smith (2013) and 
Peter Plagens (1994 and 2014) I do not attempt to prove any of these to be incorrect, 
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inaccurate or misinformed. Rather, I examine the existing literature to establish my 
foundation and justifications (from an artist’s point of view) for further interpretation of 
Nauman’s work. Due to the limited scope of this study, I expand on fountains by 
referring only to Duchamp’s Fountain (1917) (fig 4), Calder’s Mercury Fountain (1937) 
(fig 5), and Craig-Martin’s An Oak Tree (1971) (fig 6 and 7) in Chapter Three. Focusing 
on Nauman’s fountains narrows the argument significantly to specific concepts that are 
the crux of the dissertation. I hope to clarify the conceptual framework of absurdity as a 
fundamental methodological process in contemporary art. 
 
In the work The True Artist Helps the World by Revealing Mystic Truths (1968) (fig 3), 
Nauman is referring to two different types of truth. The ‘true’/truth denoted in True 
Artist is something that suggests a genuineness, or rather a legitimacy. For Nauman, 
there exists a sense of authenticity in how and why the artist makes art. This truth is 
‘made’ (Rorty 1989:7). The second ‘true’/truth, a Mystic Truth, indicates something less 
concrete and suggests a type of truth that is more absolute and so belonging to an 
abstract plane beyond human logic and understanding – a truth ‘found’ (Rorty 1989:7). 
Regardless of the type of truth Nauman implies, he places responsibility on the 
shoulders of the ‘true artist’, as if enlightenment5 were the duty of the artist. 
 
Significance implies more than legitimacy. To have legitimacy an object must bear the 
qualities of signification. This signification is also applicable to the re-introduction of the 
non-art object in the 1960 and the ‘elitist’ qualities previously bestowed upon artworks 
                                                          
5 Emanuel Kant (Kant in Bristow 2011) describes Enlightenment as a way one reflects on the 
world and oneself, a way of being independent in thought. It is possible for the individual to find 
truth, “as one progressively breaks free form the constraints of institutional ideologies, such as 
religion, and becomes more self-directed the more fulfilling the human existence becomes” 
(Bristow 2011). I also acknowledge the critical view of the Enlightenment project that exists 
today in the critique of authentic truth and reason, and take the view that Duchamp and 
Nauman contribute to its questioning. 
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such as Fountain (1917) (fig 4)6. An object becomes a signal for identifying other 
objects comparable to it and depending on one’s experience of that particular object 
will determine the importance of how corresponding objects are experienced (Morris 
1971:179). The signal object begins to have significance (positively or negatively) held 
against its counterparts for identification. My interpretations of The True Artist Helps 
the World by Revealing Mystic Truths (1968) (fig 3), and The True Artist is an Amazing 
Luminous Fountain (Window or Wall Shade) (1966) (fig 1) are that Nauman suggests 
the artist is seen as a person with a noteworthy worldview, someone with authority in 
their field, and therefore has significance in legitimacy. However, in the statement, 
there is also a strong sense of the impossible, which makes the significance of the 
artist in the revealing of truths unlikely, and, perhaps, even somewhat humiliating. I 
discuss these ideas further in Chapter Three on the work of Nauman, and in Chapter 
Four concerning my own work. 
 
Throughout this study the insights into Nauman’s approaches and methodologies are 
therefore applied as a lens through which to develop, examine and consider my work. 
Furthermore, my practice becomes a mode of rationality through related ideas and 
thus brings a unique understanding of Nauman’s concepts by referrals made through 
subject matter (such as the fountain), puns, failing and descriptive titles of works that 
suggest confounding truths in language (see section 2.1.4 on Wittgenstein and the 
absurd).  
  
                                                          
6 Many artists in the 1960s were exploring the non-traditional work of Duchamp and other 
Dadaists again, in order to challenge the modernist notions of ‘high’ art and the given ‘status’ to 
the likes of Duchamp within the art establishment (Godfrey 1998:7-14). 
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1.6 OUTLINE OF DISSERTATION 
 
Chapter Two provides a specific conceptual framework of the absurd as found in 
Camus and Sartre’s discourses (sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3). The purpose of this 
literature review is to ascertain what the absurd is in relation to Nauman and my own 
art practices. 
 
I apply the absurd as a conceptual framework by firstly discussing the writings of 
Camus where the absurd is a way of being and inescapable. I then tackle specific 
texts by Sartre who regards the realisation that absurdity is rooted in existence as 
fundamental to a chosen purpose regardless of the nausea it inflicts. Furthermore, I 
take into account the manner in which Wittgenstein highlights the paradoxical nature of 
language and the existence of the absurd within a rationalisation of words. To 
conclude the chapter I refer to meaning found in, or in spite of the absurd. The absurd 
exists, but it does not prevent one from making meaning. Meaning discovered, by 
identifying relevant signs, makes what we observe significant and in turn assists in 
attaching value even to that which is found to be absurd. 
 
Chapter Three discusses Nauman’s fountain artworks and shows how the absurd 
presents itself therein. I put the fountain into context by giving a historical background, 
referring thereafter to specific literature that applies fountains metaphorically to elicit 
meaning in art, such as: in the case of Heidegger (1950:31) when explaining the 
significance of art in a historical context; and regarding Freud’s (2009:22) analyses of 
the subconscious in comparison to a fountain. I then discuss how fountains have been 
implemented by other artists and compare these to Nauman’s conceptualisation 
thereof. 
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The investigation into Nauman’s work is also considered in Chapter Three. His 
approach to art is explained before the absurd, as a conceptual framework, is 
elaborated on in the context of his artworks. The absurd is made applicable to specific 
fountain works created by Nauman in the 1960s. Comparisons are made to other 
artworks that hold conceptual and objective relevance to Nauman’s approach. 
Duchamp’s Fountain (1917) (fig 4) is significant because of the multiple absurdities 
that exist within the reading of his work and assists in establishing the conceptual 
framework within Nauman's art practice. Many of Nauman’s titles become puns about 
the visual elements and vice versa. Duchamp was interested in visual and literary puns 
and associations as they not only carried meaning but also produced meaning (Howell 
1977:30). The established meanings of the visuals and literary elements start to 
perform new expressions and challenge conventional understanding of everyday 
objects and actions. Chapter Three sets up the platform to discuss absurdity in my 
artworks in Chapter Four. 
 
I elaborate on the absurd as a conceptual framework in Chapter Four by comparing 
my own practices to those of Nauman, and, by extension, to Duchamp. I break down 
the important aspects of interest, such as behaviour, significance, and the use of 
language, to clearly show the influence of Nauman on my thinking, and the concept of 
the absurd on my approach and analysis of art. The elements in my artworks are 
indicative of Nauman’s use of puns and associations of both the visual and the literary. 
Puns by definition bring into question the truth of the subject referred to because the 
wordplay emphasises double meaning and perplexity (Culler 2005:178 and 187). In 
this light, puns are both truths and deceptions and hinge on how language is 
constructed around objects or bodies in art. I conclude Chapter Four by referring to the 
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repetitive nature and solitude of being an artist and express my knowledge that not all 
areas of conceptual relevance can be surveyed in this dissertation, but only selected 
concepts are discussed. My work was exhibited in April of 2016 at the UNISA Art 
Gallery at an exhibition titled Neither Art Nor Art. I presented my art inspired by 
Nauman and his application of the absurd and fountains at that venue (please refer to 
the accompanying catalogue). 
 
Chapter Five concludes the dissertation by looking back to pertinent issues mentioned 
in the Introduction. By reflecting on what I set out to achieve in Chapter One is 
rendered successful or unsuccessful here, and elaborations are made as to the 
reasons why it is so. The Research Problem, Research Objectives, Research 
Questions and the Scope and Significance of the Study are drawn together to justify 
the chosen argument that the absurd is a relevant theory in making art. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW: THE ABSURD IN CONTEXT 
 
Rorty’s (1989:7) arguments regarding ‘truth’ is the point of departure in this chapter to 
clarify that absurdity in art is a truth made rather than found. Furthermore, I discuss the 
concept of the absurd and how it relates to Nauman. This is followed by an analysis of 
Sartre and Camus’s notion of the absurd respectively. I also examine Wittgenstein’s 
explanation of the absurd in language and show his impact on Nauman. I discuss 
meaning by referring to Heidegger’s reasoning about the absurd, and Morris’s theories 
regarding signification and significance to support the idea that the absurd holds value. 
Finally, an argument of how the absurd relates to fountains in art is made. The 
fountain, which is discussed in Section 2.3, is a symbol of the cyclical nature of 
behaviour in art. As mentioned in Chapter One, a fountain repeats on itself, the 
representation of a cycle is metaphorical of reflexive behaviours and I regard this as 
an act of absurdity in the context of my practices as an artist. 
 
Art has a lasting relationship with absurdity, which is fundamental in the mechanisation 
of the conception, realisation, and understanding of art. The word ‘absurd’ refers to 
that which is pointless or meaningless in human life and actions (merriam-webster.com 
Sv “absurd”). More specifically, it is a “term used by existentialists to describe that 
which one might have thought to be amenable to reason, but which turns out to be 
beyond the limits of rationality” (Honderich 2005:3). In Section 2.1.1 I refer briefly to 
Samuel Beckett, a playwright and author, whose absurdist approach to storytelling has 
influenced Nauman. 
 
Absurdity in art can be seen in how we document art. Tristan Tzara (2003:1) for 
example, wrote about the nature of art documentation in the ‘Dada Manifesto’ saying “I 
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am against action; for continuous contradiction, for affirmation too, I am neither for nor 
against and I do not explain because I hate common sense” (Tzara 2003:5). The quote 
by Tzara explicates that everything with a given purpose has a paradoxical moral 
value and that, ultimately and simultaneously represents life and means nothing 
(Tzara 2003:5). Similarly, in the mid-1950s at the advent of Pop Art in the United 
States, not only did Andy Warhol endeavour to alter the meaning of art by speaking of 
his desire to be a machine, but he also desired that the ‘art lover’ be regarded more as 
a consumer and he explicitly positions them as such (De Duve 1989:9). When 
Conceptualism was at its pinnacle in the late 1960s and early 1970s, artists 
challenged the elitism of art by re-introducing non-art objects (as referred to in section 
1.5), ideas, methodologies, and presentations into art practices in order to disrupt and 
confound both the art establishment and the ‘art lover’, and in so doing, redefining 
what constitutes value in an artwork (Alberro and Stimson 1999:421). 
 
It is within the aforementioned historical context that Nauman started creating art in the 
1960s (The theatre work and literature of Beckett to which I referred earlier is similar to 
that of Nauman, for example). The senselessness and the inadequacy of rationality is 
what Nauman achieves in his artworks and transmits to the viewer. As such, this 
literature review examines the work of Nauman and relates it to the existentialist notion 
of the incongruous. 
 
I consider the relevance of the philosophies of the absurd of Sartre and Camus. I 
establish a theoretical justification of the conceptual framework that is applicable to 
both my own work and the work of Nauman. What Sartre (1938:68) and Camus 
(1955:69) say about absurdity – that absurdity is an unavoidable truth in human 
existence – demonstrates its necessity in art making. Sartre and Camus both 
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emphasise that life and the world around us, our very existence, is meaningless and 
therefore absurd (Sartre 1938:4; Camus 1955:9). Camus refers to the “gradual return” 
emphasising life’s repetitiveness in The Myth of Sisyphus (1955:10)7. 
 
2.1 NAUMAN IN CONTEXT 
 
Nauman deals with concepts of the mundane, the everyday human behaviour and 
activity. In so doing he inadvertently and subversively deals with ideas that are meant 
to elevate art, or that make it something to be taken seriously8. In this dissertation, I 
engage with the absurd in Nauman’s work and how it becomes a means to subvert the 
existing art establishment, not with mean intent to overthrow, but rather to expose its 
shortcomings. Some literature that has been examined regarding the absurd in 
Nauman’s work include essays and texts from A Rose has No Teeth: Bruce Nauman 
in the 1960s (2007) edited by Constance Lewallen; and Bruce Nauman: A True Artist 
(2014), by Peter Plagens. I predominantly (but not exclusively) look at the writings of 
Godfrey in Conceptual Art (1998); Arthur C. Danto from the Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace: A Philosophy of Art (1981); and The Abuse of Beauty: Aesthetics and 
the Concept of Art (2003). Both Danto and Godfrey’s links to contemporary 
sensibilities including and deviating from early twentieth-century conceptual art are 
further reasons for my selection of these particular sources amongst the myriad of 
sources on conceptual art. Focusing on the listed writings allows for an underpinning 
                                                          
7 In The Myth of Sisyphus (1955) Camus tells the story of King Sisyphus who was punished by 
the god’s for his numerous deceptions and his hubristic nature. The punishment was for 
Sisyphus to push a large bolder up a hill. Once he had reached its pinnacle the rock would roll 
back down and Sisyphus would have to repeat this activity for all eternity. Camus uses the 
story as a parallel to human existence, that what one does from day to day is no more 
meaningful than what Sisyphus was subjected to (Camus 1955:7 and 34). 
8 In the 1960’s, when Nauman was starting his career as an artist, Modernism and its pursuit of 
the ‘Avant-garde’ still governed the popular notions of what art was and for whom it was made 
under as Modernism still stood as the authority within the art establishment at the time (Atkins, 
1993:140). 
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of the theoretical stance that the absurd is a principled ‘device’ in the conception and 
delivery of an artwork. In so doing, I argue that it is perhaps in the absurd where true 
value in art lies, specifically in the case of Nauman’s work. To reach the 
aforementioned conclusion, I summarise key sources from the writings of Sartre, such 
as Nausea (1938) and Being and Nothingness (1949), and from Camus, such as The 
Myth of Sisyphus (1942) and the Rebel (1951). I refer to the Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (1921) by Wittgenstein to support the idea of the absurd in language, a 
significant linguistic influence on Nauman. 
 
2.1.1  The Absurd 
 
The notion of truth is important in the context of this dissertation, because the absurd 
is not necessarily deceptive or untrue, but does bring into question the significance of 
artworks. I discuss Wittgenstein in more detail in section 2.1.4, but when he (2010:223) 
says “a rose has no teeth” it is empirically so, yet it is a confounding announcement 
due to its perplexing association. The combining of the propositions, ‘teeth’, and ‘a 
rose’, into a sentence leave one with a sense of questioning, not of truth, but rather of 
the unusual thought processes of the author. If Wittgenstein intended to be untruthful, 
he might have said that “a rose has teeth”. This is obviously untrue as there exists no 
evidence to substantiate the claim. However, the efficacy of such a statement is dull in 
comparison to “a rose has no teeth”. It is believed to be true and is effective in 
confounding the reader due to its claim. Harry Frankfurt (2005:59) in his book On 
Bullshit, claims that “[b]oth in lying and telling the truth people are guided by their 
beliefs concerning the way things are”. Further, he states that a bullshitter “is neither 
on the side of the true nor on the side of the false” (Frankfurt 2005:55). A bullshitter is 
guided also by his/her beliefs, but is unconcerned about truth or lies and is only 
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selective of either to “suit his [sic] purpose” (Frankfurt 2005:59). However, what of the 
artist who is concerned about the viewer’s reception of his/her artwork? The truth 
about what Nauman is conveying through his work is made in the beliefs of the viewer. 
To bewilder the viewer into questioning what is true or not places more responsibility 
on the viewer to grapple with the paradox thereof. As stated in Section 1.5, according 
to Rorty (1989:7) “truth is made rather than found”, but this is only because of 
language. He states: 
 
If we could ever become reconciled to the idea that most of reality is indifferent to our 
descriptions of it, and that the human self is created by the use of a vocabulary, then 
we should at least have assimilated what was true in the Romantic idea that truth is 
made rather than found. What is true about this claim is just that languages are made 
rather than found, and that truth is a property of linguistic entities, of sentences (Rorty 
1989:7).  
 
When Nauman employs the words, ‘the true artist helps the world by revealing mystic 
truths’, it is a case of bewilderment because of the arrangement within ‘linguistic 
entities’. Changing a urinal into a Fountain (1917) (fig 4) does not alter the fact that it 
appears to be a urinal, but it also does not prevent it from being a fountain, at least not 
in the mind of the viewer in the context of art. The urinal is a fountain because it can 
be believed to be so and because Duchamp ‘made’ it so. In Nauman’s case 
specifically the absurd is used to straddle the line between truth and untruth and keeps 
the viewer in uncertainty. 
 
The concept of the absurd is exemplified in the work of playwright and author, Samuel 
Beckett 9. Beckett was a significant contributor to what Martin Esslin called The 
                                                          
9 Samuel Beckett was a writer who produced a number of plays from the late 1940s until the 
1960s. It is evident that most of his plays were written with an underlying structure of absurdity. 
In the case of Beckett the absurd is that which is irrational and unreasonable and used it as a 
means to confound an audience. The confusion and inconclusive narratives the plays delivered 
left spectators with a sense of pondering and the questioning of values and the meaning of life. 
His most known works are, Waiting for Godot (1948-1949) (2010), and Endgame (1955-1957) 
(2009). 
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Theatre of the Absurd, which is also the title of Esslin’s book written in 1961. Esslin 
(1961:12) says “the Theatre of the Absurd strives to express its sense of the 
senselessness of the human condition and the inadequacy of the rational approach by 
the open abandonment of rational devices and discursive thought”. Furthermore, the 
Theatre of the Absurd functions as a “dramatic expression to the philosophical notion 
of the ‘absurd’, a notion that had received widespread diffusion following the 
publication of Albert Camus's essay Le Mythe de Sisyphe in 1942” (Birch 2009:35). 
Importantly, “to define the world as absurd is to recognize its fundamentally mysterious 
nature, and this recognition is frequently associated with feelings of loss, 
purposelessness, and bewilderment” (Birch 2009:35). 
  
From an existential point of view, accepting the absurd is a good place to start in one’s 
appreciation of the world aesthetically through the experience of nature (Van Deurzen 
& Kenward 2005:1). For Camus (1955:7) “everything contributes to spreading 
confusion”, yet a confounding existence is a good reason for expressions in art. He 
says “[i]f the world were clear, art would not exist” (Camus 1955:63). 
 
Existentialism as a philosophical movement can be traced back to the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries. Existentialism developed especially as a response to 
Christian faith. For example, Søren Kierkegaard (2009:177) clearly relates absurdity to 
God’s existence, saying:  
 
So what is the absurd? The absurd is that the eternal truth has come about in time, that 
God has come about, has been born, has grown up, etc., has come about just as the 
single human being, indistinguishable from any other, since all immediate 
recognisability is pre-Socratic paganism and from the Jewish point of view idolatry. 
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To the existentialist, religion and religious morality are seen as the legacy of slave 
morality, mediocrity, weakness, and safety/security, as opposed to personal 
excellence and free will (Mautner 1996:209). 
 
Furthermore, existentialism focuses strongly on the role of the individual and that for 
which the individual is personally responsible (Mautner 1996:207). Yet, this personal 
responsibility embraces all people, not only the self, and in so doing burdens us. 
Sartre (2007:3) asks “[w]hat do we mean by saying that existence precedes essence? 
We mean that man [sic] first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the world – 
and defines himself afterwards” (see also Kearney & Rainwater 1995:67 - 68). The 
relevance to art, however, is not necessarily so simple. This is especially true in cases 
where the artist is the subject of the artwork's existence, as is the case in Self-Portrait 
as a Fountain (1966/67) (fig 8), and artworks, generally speaking, are made for an 
audience and therefore the individual’s (artist’s) responsibility is to all. 
 
 
 
 
Fig 8. Bruce Nauman, Self-Portrait as a Fountain (1966/67) 
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The utilisation of absurdity is an act of intentional subversion on Nauman’s part in 
order to establish a sense of playful unease in the viewer. This conscious activity 
makes his practice all the more incongruent. For example, in Failing to Levitate in the 
Studio (1966) (fig 9), Nauman discloses his deceptions by revealing the ‘trick’ of using 
chairs to attempt to levitate. Revealing the failure is how Nauman takes responsibility 
for the absurd attempt. 
 
 
 
 
 
The absurd, as a conceptual structure – as if it were a neurological network running 
through a body – is important in understanding my interpretation of Nauman’s 
phenomenology. Existentially speaking the paradox of life is found in art - the 
realisation that the only purpose in life is the one I make for myself. Life, and what we 
purpose in life, is absurd, and since art is, fundamentally speaking, representational of 
life, art has a responsibility to the absurd. 
 
 
 
Fig 9. Bruce Nauman, Failing to Levitate in the Studio (1966) 
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2.1.2  Camus and the Absurd 
 
For Camus absurdity is a natural phenomenon that is part of human existence and is 
to be embraced (Jansen 2013). This is illustrated by his works The Myth of Sisyphus 
(1942) and The Rebel (1951). In both these works, he remains “sceptical of 
conclusions about the meaning of life, yet both works assert objectively valid answers 
to key questions about how to live” (Aronson 2012). His philosophical works focus on 
subjects such as death and how it is impossible to know the experience of death while 
living (Marshall 2000:2). Camus (1955:3) says that “there is only one really serious 
philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Deciding whether or not life is worth living is 
to answer the fundamental question in philosophy. All other questions follow from 
that”. 
 
The many notions of death, especially with respect to suicide not being a viable option 
in a purposeless world, leads Camus to regard existence as absurd and meaningless, 
as is evident in his rendition of Sisyphus indefinitely rolling the rock up the hill, only to 
watch it roll down again (Camus 1955:75; Marshall 2000:2). The absurd must be 
embraced if we are to find a sense of happiness within it (Aronson 2012). The 
irrational proposition of this story and its tensional implication is the start of my 
understanding of the absurd via Camus. He says “the absurd is an experience that 
must be lived through, a point of departure” (Camus 1991:8). In The Myth of Sisyphus 
(1942), Camus asks the reader to identify with the subject by imagining Sisyphus in 
‘harmony’ and not ‘hostility’ (Hall 1960:29), despite the fact that he will continue the 
repetitive activity of rolling the rock over and over for eternity. This was imposed upon 
Sisyphus as a punishment by the gods for his deceptions, but Camus (1955:75) 
concludes “[o]ne must imagine Sisyphus happy”. 
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Trying to make sense of the world and applying rationality to it is in itself futile. This is 
evident in Nauman’s artworks discussed here and demonstrated by Camus (1955:5) 
asserting that “[b]eginning to think is beginning to be undermined” - existence is, in 
essence, contradictory. The absurd is a mirror to our existence, and accepting this 
becomes, in itself, a reason to live (Camus 1955:25). 
 
Essentially, it seems the human state is no more than tragic. The ontological 
investigations that we make should lead us to understand that nature is unplanned and 
unpredictable, but that we should still find value in our existence, as Camus suggests 
Sisyphus should. In the context of art and particularly in Nauman’s work Self-Portrait 
as a Fountain (1966/67) (fig 8) the value of the artist’s behaviour is compared to that of 
a fountain. Because of Duchamp’s Fountain (1917) (fig 4) fountains have become 
synonymous with representations of ‘non-art’ art object10. Because of Fountain (1917) 
(fig 4), a dialetheia (a self-referencing paradox11) exists within the art establishment 
(Priest & Berto 2013). Duchamp (2002:38) said in 1961, of his readymades, “[t]here is 
an absolute contradiction, but that is what is enjoyable, isn’t it? Bringing in the idea of 
contradiction, the notion of contradiction, which is something that has never really 
been used, you see?” 
 
                                                          
10 In The Collected Essays and Criticism (O’Brian 1993:253), Clement Greenburg (1967) says 
that artists working with objects “commit themselves to the third dimension because it is… a 
coordinate that art has to share with non-art (as Dada, Duchamp and others already saw)”. 
What Duchamp understood about the readymade was that it lived in this space between art 
and non-art forever committed to its own paradox.  
11 A self-referencing paradox, or the paradox of self-reference, falls into the category of set-
theory. Set-theory belongs to the broader philosophical theory of Dialetheia, which is a 
sentence, statement, or a proposition where the subject can both be itself and its negation in 
the same context. X and the negation of X are both accurate in a statement. Or it can be said 
that the sentence is both false and true. Therefore, it is fair to say that Dialetheias are true 
contradictions (Priest & Berto 2013).  
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2.1.3 Sartre and the Absurd 
 
Sartre encountered Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenology12 while studying at the French 
Institute in Berlin (Thomas 2013). Sartre challenges phenomenological methodology 
by developing ontological accounts of what it means to be human. His existential 
phenomenology grapples with the unstable co-existence of the empirical and the 
inevitable freedoms within an apathetic world (Onof [Sa]). Furthermore, Sartre 
proposed that the natural world can be described in a scientific sense, but the 
empirical nature of things does not necessarily constitute an understanding thereof. In 
Self-Portrait as a Fountain (1966/67) (fig 8) it is clear that Nauman can eject water 
from his mouth, as would a sculpture in a fountain (such as in Fontana di Trevi (The 
Trevi Fountain) (1732) (fig 10) [see section 2.2.1]), but this does not scientifically 
render Nauman’s body a fountain. The nature of fountains can be described through 
Nauman's body but fails to reveal the empirical character of a fountain. For Sartre 
(2007:3), human “existence precedes essence” as he explains in his lecture 
‘Existentialism Is a Humanism’ (1945). A lack of reasoning is encountered when 
attempting to gain insight into human existence from a purely scientific platform, and 
meaning is only gained after the fact. He uses the illustration of the paper knife to 
illustrate. He explains: 
 
[i]f one considers an article of manufacture as, for example, a book or a paper-knife – 
one sees that it has been made by an artisan who had a conception of it: and he has 
paid attention, equally, to the conception of a paper-knife and to the pre-existent 
                                                          
12 Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology is considered one of the most important philosophical 
influences in the twentieth century (Kockelmans 1994:53). Not engaged in thinking about the 
metaphysical or theoretical speculations phenomenology, to Husserl, is a scientific 
investigation. For philosophy to become a rigorous science in its own right it would have to 
push aside an attitude regarding the nature of things (empirical evidence) and rather embrace 
phenomenology as a science of consciousness (Kockelmans 1994:53). Phenomenology can be 
understood as describing the human centred experience of a thing regardless of the gathered 
scientific data that proves its nature (Kockelmans 1994:53). But, for Heidegger, 
"phenomenology… is not a descriptive, detached analysis of consciousness. It is a method of 
access to being" (Korab-Karpowicz, [Sa]). 
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technique of production which is a part of that conception, and is, at bottom, a formula 
(Sartre 2007:2).  
 
Human essence, however, differs from that of the article of manufacture, such as the 
paper-knife. He says “[a]theistic existentialism, of which I am a representative, 
declares with greater consistency that if God does not exist there is at least one being 
whose existence comes before its essence, a being which exists before it can be 
defined by any conception of it. That being is man [sic]…” (Sartre 2007:2). As a human 
being, I have consciousness and I am therefore free, yet my consciousness and my 
freedom are only my own and not common to others. Sartre (2007:566) states: 
 
It is freedom which is the foundation of all essence since man [sic] reveals intra-
mundane essences by surpassing the world toward his own possibilities. But actually 
the question is of my freedom. Similarly when I describe consciousness, I could not 
discuss a nature common to certain individuals but only my particular consciousness, 
which like my freedom is beyond essence. 
 
According to Sartre, the absurd lies in the ontological response to the world, the result 
of which is ‘nausea’ and ‘disgust’ (Sartre 1938:21-23).  However, occasionally, 
aesthetic experience is what brings moments of worthiness, where the ‘hero’ stands 
above the drudgery of the mundane nausea (Sartre 1938:88). The aesthetic 
experience of Failing to Levitate in the Studio (1966) (fig 9) reveals the failed attempts 
of the artist achieving the impossible. It also quickly shows that the artist does not 
attempt to hide how he tries to convince the viewer of the impossible task. The artwork 
simultaneously embarrasses and exonerates the artist, making Nauman peculiarly 
courageous and conceivably a ‘true artist’ in his failure. Notions of a ‘true artist’ in this 
context are discussed further in Section 2.2.3 and in Section 3.2. 
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2.1.4 Wittgenstein and the absurd 
 
Wittgenstein (1961:76), in Tractatus Logico-Philisophicus (1921), emphasises how 
language (and how we use words) often confound our understanding of the world 
around us. Although a logical and rational application of language defines the natural 
world, the way in which we use language can create unusual and confusing 
perspectives even as it remains logical. 
 
Wittgenstein (1961:76) says, “Logic fills the world: the limits of the world are also its 
limits. We cannot, therefore, say in logic: This and this there is in the world, that there 
is not”. Emphasising the confusing nature of language and the process of defining 
absurdity will clarify my stance regarding language in the visual and the literary format 
and how it relates to Nauman’s practice. The literary rendition, for example in the title 
of an artwork, is often a repeat of the visual and vice versa, thus creating a back and 
forth and is, at times, a mere descriptive of the object or image presented. I elaborate 
on this concept in my comparison between Nauman and Duchamp to further justify the 
applicable philosophical investigation in Section 3.3. 
 
2.1.5 Meaning in the absurd  
 
According to Heidegger, only that which has no meaning, or where meaning cannot be 
found becomes absurd. Heidegger (1953:65) states “[t]he absurd does not draw you 
into itself; rather, of its own nature, it pushes you back. It pushes you back from itself, it 
directs you to the very thing that you experience as slipping out of meaning”. Nauman 
‘pushes you back’ in The True Artist Helps the world by Revealing Mystic Truths 
(1968) (fig 3). The very thing (truth) slips out of meaning as the viewer experiences the 
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artwork. Questions concerning the meaning or purpose to our existence arise, and 
thereby our value systems begin to surface. Value is given to an object according to 
how the said object is perceived and what intentionality13 it imparts – Nauman’s 
artworks question merit and the importance we attached to things such as artworks. 
Finding meaning in something implies significance and significance attribute value to 
‘discovered’ meaning. In his research paper Symbols and Values: an Initial Study 
presented at the 1953 Symposium of the conference on Science, Religion and 
Philosophy, Charles Morris (1953:156) indicates that meaning is “double-faced” and 
his analytical expression of this is that one side of meaning has “signification” while the 
other side has “significance” (Morris 1953:563). Signification shows what an object’s 
indicative nature is to other objects like it, whereas significance has to do with the 
object’s value. In a later publication, Writings on the General Theories of Signs, Morris 
(1971:179) says:  
 
[i]n reading a poem in which suffering is presented as of great positive significance, the 
reader… signifies suffering as having such significance. If he himself accords to 
suffering the importance signified, he may deliberately seek poems of this kind as a 
way of evoking, strengthening and interrogating his own attitudes; if such is not the 
case he, as a reader, nevertheless participates for a moment in a sign-process in which 
suffering is signified as having positive significance. 
 
Human existence signifies precisely itself, a human existence, but it can only be made 
significant (have value) because of how we choose to perceive it. “Life has a meaning 
if we choose to give it one”, says Sartre, in Nausea (1938:58). We are thrown into a 
world with no meaning or design (Sartre 1938:2). Difficulties (suffering) are the order of 
the day – as is evident in Nauman’s artworks that constitute his failures, such as 
                                                          
13 Intentionality, in this particular case, refers to the ability the mind has to form representations 
of things and has little to do with the intention to act on something. Things exist purely because 
they are in the mind (Jacob 2014). Intentionality has to do with how connected to the 
surrounding world a subject is (Honderich 2014:36-37). It is the ability of the mind to form 
representations, but for Heidegger intentionality refers to the ability to ‘care’. If care is taken or 
given to something (a thing or a being) the potential for significance (given value) is possible 
(Heidegger 1953:293). Nauman playfully draws his viewer’s attention to the seriousness of 
what we care for.  
31 
 
Failing to Levitate in the Studio (1966) (fig 9); and in my own artworks, such as Cutting 
Corners (2016) (fig 17) – as human beings try to find their worth in the world. Camus 
(1955:63) claims that art only exists because the world is confusing and unclear, yet it 
is acceptable that we extend value to artworks when they echo (or attempt to escape) 
the difficulties humanity faces from day to day. 
It is not unreasonable to state that intentionality is (broadly speaking) the ability of the 
mind to form representations or particular states of being, such as believing, hoping, or 
judging (Jacobs 2014). In his publication, Being and Time (1953:299), Heidegger 
refers to intentionality as the ability to ‘care’. Adding value to that which exists and how 
we perceive the world is what adds value to existence, both physically and mentally 
(Heidegger 1953:299). However, at times, something unusual occurs between the 
physical world and a cerebral landscape. According to Sartre (1938:65-66), this is 
where absurdity resides. He writes the following regarding this space between physical 
existence and attempts at rationalising existence:  
 
The word absurdity is coming to life under my pen; a little while ago, in the garden, I 
couldn't find it, but neither was I looking for it, I didn't need it: I thought without words, 
on things, with things. Absurdity was not an idea in my head [.] [W]ithout formulating 
anything clearly, I understood that I had found the key to Existence, the key to my 
Nauseas, to my own life. In fact, all that I could grasp beyond that returns to this 
fundamental Absurdity (Sartre 1938:65-66). 
 
It is paradoxical that the world has nothing rational to offer and that humankind still 
tries to rationalize it (Camus 1955:15), yet embracing the absurd leaves an occasional 
sense of harmony with the world, moments where a shared experience with nature is 
extraordinary and sublime (Deranty 2015). It is through art that the experience shared 
is reflected upon, such as the mirror that reflects the absurdity of life for Camus, or the 
key to existence for Sartre. It all returns to a fundamental absurdity like water from a 
fountain that returns on itself. 
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2.2 FOUNTAINS IN CONTEXT 
 
In this section, I discuss fountains in the context of the title of this dissertation, Bruce 
Nauman: The Artist is an Absurd Fountain. The fountain is elementary as it signifies 
the cyclical nature of existence and the reoccurrence of absurdity in human 
expression. The repetitive nature of the artist’s behaviour expresses the absurdity of 
the artist’s practice. The repetitive process when making art is discussed in this 
dissertation as it pertains to the cyclical nature of fountains. I will firstly discuss a 
historical background to the fountain to stress the importance of fountains and the 
sustainability and basic survival of communities. Maurus Servius Honoratus (1471)14, 
an Italian Grammarian in the fourth century AD, said, “Nullus enimin fons non sacer” 
translated, “there is no spring which is not sacred” (global.britannica.com 1998 Sv 
“fountain”). The significance of fountains changed due to the advancements in water 
supply systems and plumbing technology and by the end of the nineteenth century 
rendered the value of the fountain to monuments or decorative features in towns and 
cities and no longer exclusively to its necessity (Ghisi 2015:2314). It is then essential 
to look at the legend of Juan Ponce De Leon and the myth of the Fountain of Youth 
(1513), and its bearing on the narrative that flowed through history, its influence on 
religion and the “sacred” (Greenspan 2013). The fountain becomes an object that 
carries with it historical and mythical concepts that formulate ideas of ‘truth’. These 
truths become absurd in the variety of ways they are used in art that expresses the 
human condition, as evidenced in figure 1, 7, 11, 12 13, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20, where I 
consider how fountains are metaphorically used to speak of existence and human 
                                                          
14 Maurus Servius Honoratus (1471) was regarded in the late fourth-century as the most 
learned scholar in Italy of his generation. His greatest achievement was his works of significant 
commentary on Virgil, a first century Roman poet, best known for the Aeneid, which was 
unfinished at the time of Virgil’s death in c. 30 AD (global.britannica.com 1998). 
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behaviour. The fountain is often compared to Freud’s interconnectivity and activities 
between the conscious and subconscious mind (Funderburk 2009:22). 
 
Furthermore, for the sake of comparison, I consider Calder’s Mercury Fountain (1937) 
(fig 5) and its emphasis on death in opposition to life-sustaining fountains. Duchamp’s 
Fountain (1917) (fig 4) will be briefly discussed here, but an in-depth analysis and 
comparison to Nauman’s fountains will be made in the next chapter. The fountain has 
been a significant symbol of subversion in art over the last hundred years, and I 
discuss its significance to justify the statement that ‘the true artist is an absurd 
fountain’. 
 
2.2.1  Historical Background of Fountains 
 
 
 
 
Understanding the concepts of the existence of fountains in history assists in 
understanding their value within the establishment of art. Fountains are significant 
contributions to social development, the structuring of communities, and town 
Fig 10. Nicola Salvi, Fontana di Trevi (The Trevi Fountain) (1732) 
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planning. As illustrated in the aforementioned examples fountains are interesting 
metaphors for human behaviour and necessity. According to an article titled ‘Short 
Global History of Fountains’ (Ghisi 2015:2315) “[f]ountains were also introduced in 
several regions as decorations and to celebrate their builders, besides being sources 
of drinking water”. 
 
Art and fountains have a significant historical relationship. As time passed and the 
functionalities of fountains were adjusted and developed, no longer posing serious 
mechanical problems, artists were invited to make these public places aesthetically 
pleasing by decorating and adorning them with socially relevant symbols. For example, 
the famous Fontana di Trevi (The Trevi Fountain) (1732) (fig 10), is a Baroque fountain 
situated in Rome. Designed by Nicola Salvi in 1732 (Pastirik 2016) the Trevi Fountain 
(1732) (fig 10) is adorned with sculptures of mythological gods and creatures. 
 
The word ‘fountain’ is derived from the Latin word fonts, the general name given to 
both natural and artificially constructed water sources for the supply of water to a 
community. These water sources were not just used for drinking, but for bathing, 
washing and ritualistic practices, such as to make a ‘wish’ or used for ‘holy rites’ (Ghisi 
2015:2314 – 2315). With bronze statues, stone masks of heroes, gods and animals in 
the Pagan-Christian cultures, and elaborate textile and ceramic designs in the Islamic 
world the aesthetic value of fountains played a significant role in the uplifting and 
sustainability of communities (Ghisi 2015:2315 – 2316). By the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries fountains were utilised in celebratory events to mark these 
occasions, and by the end of the nineteenth century, the necessity of most fountains 
was replaced by the advent of modern plumbing. The advances in water supply 
technologies rapidly improved and supplied water to various destinations within cities 
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for multiple purposed assigning the value of fountains to their entertainment and 
aesthetic qualities (Ghisi 2015:2316). 
 
In 1513 Ponce de Leon, the Spanish explorer set out to locate the Fountain of Youth. 
The legend built around Ponce de Leon is clouded with speculation, furthering the 
mythical narrative that already existed regarding the Fountain of Youth (Greenspan 
2013).The average fountain already supplies life-sustaining water, but imagine if it 
were possible for a fountain to give water that sustained one’s life eternally. The myth 
of the Fountain of Youth (1513) claims that drinking from it will heal the sick and 
reverse the aging process, an escape from the clutches of death (Greenspan 2013).  
Because of its metaphysical qualities, the value of the Fountain of Youth (1513) is 
much greater than any ordinary fountain. However, the legend has no true value as it 
is a myth. Its mystical properties, however, allows the imagination to explore the 
possibilities of such an object in existence, even if the rational mind knows that such a 
fountain cannot exist. The Fountain of Youth (1513) becomes a fairy-tale, yet the 
legend continues to live on perpetuating a worthiness that is embedded in its own 
absurdity. 
 
2.2.2  Perspectives of Fountains in Literature 
 
Following the contextualising of the relevant history of fountains in this section, I reflect 
on literature where fountains have been applied in a metaphorical manner in relation to 
human existence and human activity within art. 
 
In his essay ‘The Origins of the Work of Art’, Heidegger (1950:31) makes reference to 
a poem by C.F. Meyer called, The Roman Fountain (Belmore 1956:49): 
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High climbs the jet and, falling, fills 
up to the brim the marble rounds 
that overflow in veils and frills,  
into a second basin's grounds;  
the second, now too rich, forsakes  
its waves and on the third one spills  
and equally it gives and takes  
and stirs and stills. 
 
For Heidegger the poem holds aesthetic significance because it suggests to him a 
historical decline of “being” (sein) (Thomson 2015) and human forgetfulness - the “fall”, 
suggesting a continuation of the forgetting of the “origin” (Ur-sprung) (Thomson 2015), 
such as the cyclical nature of a fountain. It also broadly suggests to Heidegger a hope 
for art to assist in introducing new historical beginnings (Thomson 2015). The 
perpetuation of a historical cycle is non-progressive (in the sense that nothing really 
changes) and the realisation thereof accentuates purposelessness and the ‘nausea’ of 
existence, to which Sartre refers.  
 
To Nauman, the re-contextualising of the fountain in conceptual art is of primary 
importance. In the case of Duchamp, an object that exists as a receptacle for urinary 
waste is comparable to a fountain. A fountain is an object that brings satisfaction and 
sustenance to the body and mind, but Duchamp manages to subvert this in Fountain 
(1917) (fig 4). It is not unreasonable to state that a urinal is the opposite of a fountain. 
It catches and drains away undesirable bodily fluids. The fountain gives forth clean 
consumable fluids. The mind compares these opposites that are now presented to the 
viewer as one-and-the-same object, yet simultaneously Duchamp does not conceal 
the fact that they are not the same. In fact, the difference between the two objects is 
emphasised by the comparison. Duchamp achieves a new ‘historical beginning’ of 
fountains in art emphasising the forgotten intentions of the fountain in history. 
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In contrast, Sigmund Freud (2009:22) says, “The conscious mind may be compared to 
a fountain playing in the sun and falling back into the great subterranean pool of the 
subconscious from which it rises”. Regarding Freud’s psychoanalytical theories, Jason 
Funderburk (2009:25) explains in his essay, ‘The Great Subterranean Pool of the 
Subconscious’, that what lies in the deepest subconscious mind reveals itself 
occasionally through a reader’s interpretation of texts. The re-emerging memories 
“discover the reality and truth behind the vagueness of words and idea” (Funderburk 
2009:25). In other words, the conscious mind will occasionally bring forth thoughts that 
are dormant in the subconscious, refer to them for clarity and let them settle once 
more in the subconscious from where they came. Freud’s comparison of the conscious 
mind to a fountain suggests that this thought behaviour is cyclical when stimulated by 
the reading of various texts. In searching for ‘reality’ and ‘truth’ (Funderburk 2009:25) 
these interpretations of texts are not confined to writing, such as in Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Meyer’s poem, but also exist for the interpretations of conceptual 
artworks, such as Calder’s Mercury Fountain (1937) (fig 5), Craig-martin’s An Oak 
Tree (1973) (fig 6), Nauman’s Self-Portrait as a Fountain (1966/67) (fig 8), and my own 
works, such as (over)look (under)stand (2016) (fig 13), and (sub)merge (2016) (fig 14). 
 
Like Duchamp, but fifty years later, Nauman seditiously adopted the fountain into his 
art making, which allows the spectator to question the object’s function in art. The 
emphasis on the fountain in Self-Portrait as a Fountain (1966/67) (fig 8) is subversively 
reflected by turning the artist into the object that performs the function Duchamp spoke 
of metaphorically, yet paradoxically. Here Nauman allows that which lies in the 
“subterranean pool” (Freud cited in Funderburk 2009:22) to once again resurface into 
the conscious mind of the viewer. 
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2.2.3  Fountains in Art 
  
Fountain (1917) (fig 4) was signed by one of Duchamp’s pseudonyms, R. Mutt and 
dated 1917 in black paint (Godfrey 1998:6). It was placed on its back, at ninety 
degrees from its intended position, suggesting that its function is no longer a 
receptacle. The plumbing was removed from the piece, perhaps suggesting that its 
title is figurative, as there is no way in which liquid can enter or exit the urinal. The 
object was not literally converted into a fountain but demands that the viewer makes a 
conceptual shift from urinal to fountain. In his important work Conceptual Art, Godfrey 
(1998:6) says “… the readymade, [Fountain (1917) (fig 4)] is presented not as a 
statement, ‘This is a urinal’, but as a question or challenge: ‘Could this urinal be an 
artwork? Imagine it as art’ …an artwork in its own right”. But the urinal was also 
introduced into art as a fountain. 
 
In 1937 at the Wold’s Fair in Barcelona Calder created Mercury Fountain (1937) (fig 5). 
The use of mercury flowing through it reflects the many deaths of slave and criminal 
workers at the Spanish Almaden Mercury Mine who died from mercury poisoning 
(atlasobscura.com Sv “mercury”). Mercury Fountain (1937) (fig 5) is clearly a 
subversion of the traditions of a fountain but exists within the expected parameters of 
what constitutes a modern artwork and its aesthetic qualities. Here a fountain is 
appropriated into art yet remains a fountain as was intended by the artist. 
 
Duchamp, on the other hand, subverted ideas of what qualifies something as art or 
non-art (Judovitz 1995:114). Duchamp selected an everyday object, a urinal, as an 
artwork, and in so doing, inadvertently redefined art. The intentions of Duchamp to 
subvert conventional perceptions succeeded in confounding the art establishment and 
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shifted the aesthetic parameters that existed at the time. Regarding aesthetic value 
and ideas concerning beauty Danto (1981:93) expressed of Fountain (1917) (fig 4), 
“what we appreciate in artworks is just what we would appreciate in non-artworks 
when in fact, they happen materially to be the same, as Fountain is from countless 
urinals…”, as if the quality of an artwork could be reduced to a “sensory examination of 
an object” (Danto 1981:98). According to Danto (1981:94), what distinguishes 
Fountain (1917) (fig 4) from other urinals is that “the work itself has properties that the 
urinals themselves lack: it is daring, impudent, irreverent, witty and clever.”  
Furthermore, he states, “[n]o sensory examination of an object will tell me that it is an 
artwork, since quality for quality it may be matched by an object that is not one, so far 
at least the qualities to which the normal senses are responsive are concerned.” 
(Danto 1981:99). To put it simply, what distinguishes an object as an artwork from its 
non-art counterparts would be the intention of the artist and the context it is placed in, 
which links to the previous discussion in Section 2.1.5 regarding meaning (Heidegger 
1953:65), significance and value (Sartre 1938:58 and Morris 1953:563), and truth we 
make or place on things such as artworks (Section 2.1.1. [Rorty 1989:7]). 
 
Arguably, if this is the case with a urinal, then the same could be said for any other 
object in existence. If fountains are primarily functional objects and one is appropriated 
into art the conceptual properties of the selected fountain distinguish it from other 
fountains. This is only true to the conceptual nature of Fountain (1917) (fig 4) as it was 
only called ‘Fountain’ and is not physically a fountain. In the case of Self-Portrait as a 
Fountain (1966/67) (fig 8), where Nauman physically steps into the role of a fountain, 
allowing the viewer to recall from the “subterranean pool of the subconscious” (Freud 
2009:22) all other fountains whether found inside or outside of art. 
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The living body of Nauman is not only an artwork but a fountain, a functional object in 
its own right. If one is to imagine Nauman as a fountain and as an artwork, then one 
can imagine him as Duchamp’s Fountain (1917) (fig 4). Like many of his 
contemporaries Nauman’s work was about everyday activity and failure, but what 
Godfrey (1998:128) says about Nauman – that is most noteworthy in the context of 
this dissertation – that distinguished Nauman from other conceptual artists was about 
“the connection, or disconnection, between thought and body …an examination of 
bodily experience”. Godfrey (1998:127) also states that “Nauman is putting centre 
stage the whole problematic nature of truth-telling by asking such questions as ‘What 
does this mean?’ ‘Is it true?’ ‘How do we know that it is true?’ ‘Could it be 
metaphorically true?’”. When looking at his various works where Nauman directly 
refers to the ‘true artist’, in particular, A True Artist is an Amazing Luminous Fountain 
(Window or Wall Shade) (1966) (fig 1), it is clear that to Nauman the question of the 
‘true’ is an absurd question that most likely has no definitive answer, yet it must be 
asked. The ‘true’, and its connections to the fountain reside in Nauman’s metaphorical 
connections to Fountain (1917) (fig 4), as well as the tradition of fountains carried 
through history. I discuss these ideas further in Chapter Three. 
 
In conclusion, understanding the profound influence of Fountain (1917) (fig 4) on the 
art establishment, and the intention of Duchamp in the making thereof elucidates 
Nauman’s choice to create a self-portrait that shows himself as the artist as a fountain. 
Because of Duchamp’s contribution, the metaphor of the fountain carries complex 
connotation in conceptual art and therefore Nauman is simultaneously commenting on 
art and on himself as an artist by becoming a fountain. Danto’s reasoning about 
Fountain (1917) (fig 4) justifies the significant use of fountains in art. Godfrey‘s 
arguments, regarding the question of the ‘true’ and the artist’s experience in body and 
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thought connectivity, further establishes the relevance of Nauman’s conceptual 
approach and his significance in challenging established art practices before the 
1960s. 
 
Existential aesthetics –particularly in the case of Sartre’s (1943:738) arguments 
regarding freedom to choose and existential discontent, and Camus’ (1955:9) 
understanding of harmonious responsibility – reminds us of how art is a representation 
of existence. It is one of the ways humans have an expression of their freedom, to 
choose how they exist, how we engage with the world. It is an example of free human 
activity. Art is therefore often devoted to expressing “the basic absurdity of the human 
condition” (Esslin 1965:13). Therefore art is able to reveal the potential of how an 
ethical and political perspective on our existence is played out, for example (Deranty 
2015). 
 
To Sartre (1938:88) and Camus (1991:8) what matters is in which manner we perceive 
our experiences of the world. The way in which human experience and the reflection of 
those experiences play off against one another, be it in art or other forms of 
representation, becomes relevant. It is not only about experiencing one’s day-to-day 
life but the level of contemplation about experiences that holds a sense of value. 
Therefore the absurd gains a sense of meaning in the work of Nauman and in my own 
work. These points about absurdity and the ‘true’ – how they relate to fountains, and in 
art practices – are discussed in further detail in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3: BRUCE NAUMAN 
 
In this chapter, the reader is introduced firstly to a background on Duchamp’s Fountain 
(1917) (fig 4) and its inadvertent influence on Nauman’s artworks. This is done in 
conjunction with the theoretical underpinning as articulated by the first research 
question of this dissertation:  
 
[W]hich theoretical influences have informed Nauman’s criticality towards social 
constructs and the art establishment; and therefore what has informed my critical 
viewpoint regarding the ‘true’ and the absurd?  
 
Although Nauman’s fountain artworks from the 1960s, such as Self-Portrait as a 
Fountain (1966/67) (fig 8) and The True Artist is an Amazing Luminous Fountain 
(Window or Wall Shade) (1966) (fig 1), are key representations to be discussed, 
referrals are made to other artworks in his oeuvre. The purpose of investigating these 
artworks is to substantiate the argument that Nauman’s work is rooted in a dedicated 
practice of the absurd. In response to the second research question, pinpointing how 
the body represents the incongruent nature of life is tackled here. For further 
corroboration, an investigation into persons who influenced Nauman is necessary, 
such as the Austrian-British philosopher Wittgenstein and his solicitations of language. 
It is important to make the connection and comparison between Nauman’s Self-Portrait 
as a fountain (1966/67) (fig 8) and Duchamp’s Fountain (1917) (fig 4) to support the 
title and crux of this dissertation – of which Nauman is a primary influence in my 
understanding that I too can be a ‘true artist’, and can investigate in what ways my 
own body represents an absurd fountain. At some point, there may be a moment when 
an incongruent reality is met with clarity through the body’s activity. By simply 
presenting the absurd in life through art I already engage in purpose, and therefore 
this questioning in itself is meaningful, absurdity and meaning can co-exist. 
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3.1. BACKGROUND 
 
As aforementioned in 1917 Duchamp’s introduction of Fountain (1917) (fig 4), a urinal, 
and everyday object inadvertently redefined art. Placing it in the gallery emphasized 
that it is no longer like other urinals, but had now been misappropriated to function as 
an action that questioned what constitutes an artwork. This, of course, is justified only 
by the context it was usurped to, the context of art, as all other urinals without 
plumbing, found in a plumber’s supply shop appear to be the same. It is not a urinal’s 
sensory properties – what it looks like – that makes Fountain (1917) (fig 4) an artwork, 
but the vast history in aesthetics that it shares with art and because of its absorption 
into the art establishment (in spite of Duchamp’s original intention to question art). 
Danto (1981:93-94) explicates the following about these sensory properties: 
 
[n]o: the properties of the object deposited in the artworld it shares with most items of 
industrial porcelain while the properties Fountain possesses as an artwork it shared 
with the Julian Tomb by Michelangelo and the Great Perseus of Cellini. If what made 
Fountain an artwork were only the qualities it shared with urinals, the question would 
arise as to what makes it an artwork and not those. 
 
As Godfrey (1998:6) articulates (as previously stated in Chapter Two) that the 
emphasis on Fountain (1917) (fig 4) is not that it ‘is a urinal’, but rather challenges the 
viewer to imagine this particular urinal as an artwork – and by its title, a Fountain 
(1917) (fig 4). Yet, it still leaves it unjustified as an artwork. It is not difficult to imagine 
the urinal as a fountain, even if it is merely an ironic understanding, but it remains 
challenging to imagine this particular urinal as art and not the same as all other urinals. 
Danto (1981:5) elaborates: 
 
[f]or the Institutional Theory of Art leaves unexplained, even if it can account for why 
such a work as Duchamp’s Fountain might have been elevated from a mere thing to an 
artwork, why that particular urinal should have sustained so impressive a promotion, 
while other urinals, like it in every obvious respect, should remain in an ontologically 
degraded category. 
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At the time Duchamp’s paradox was difficult to accept, particularly by the institutions 
that claimed authority as the electors of high art (Cairns 2012). With the entry of 
Fountain (1917) (fig 4) into the Society of Independent Artists exhibition (1917), 
Duchamp’s intention was to subvert and undermine the art establishment questioning 
the elitist notions that determine what art is (Gopnik 2011). This critical questioning 
becomes one of the core characteristics and remains essential in contemporary art. 
 
As previously stated, what is also important is that the urinal was not literally converted 
into a fountain, but by calling it something other than what it appears to be, elicits a 
comparison between the two objects in the mind of the viewer. Duchamp’s turn away 
from the realm of aesthetics to a conceptual paradigm within art, moved art away from 
a visual satisfaction to one rooted in critical thought. “I by contrast see Duchamp as 
the artist who above all has sought to produce an artwork without aesthetics, and to 
replace the sensuous with the intellectual” (Danto 2005:96). Duchamp was making 
‘non-art’ (Judovitz 1995:114) in order to challenge the status quo of art. 
 
Understanding the profound influence of Fountain (1917) (fig 4) on the art 
establishment, and the perceived intention of Duchamp in the making of this artwork 
elucidates Nauman’s choice to create a self-portrait that shows himself as a fountain. It 
is due to Duchamp’s gesture that the conceptual embodiment of the fountain has 
carried complex and far-reaching connotation into conceptual art. Therefore Nauman, 
in Self-Portrait as a Fountain (1966/67) (fig 8), is simultaneously commenting on art – 
not only as a practice but also as an institution – and on himself as an artist by 
embodying a fountain. 
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In the mid-1960’s Nauman’s interactions and collaborations with language, 
performance, new mediums, and documentation, such as film, were fast becoming the 
foundational elements in art practice particularly in conceptual art (Schellekens 2009). 
Nauman employed the above against a backdrop of simple human behaviour and 
activity. For example, he was concerned with psychologically understanding what he 
was doing in the studio, particularly when he found himself in the 1960s with little 
money to purchase materials for making work (Plagens 2014:72). Questions such as: 
‘how should I behave? How should I think? How should I feel?’ would be asked 
against the fundamental understanding of himself as an artist in the studio, not 
necessarily doing anything specifically artistic in the conventional sense of the word.  
 
It is against this background that Self-Portrait as a Fountain (1966/67) (fig 8) was 
created. His actions as a fountain in Self-Portrait as a Fountain (1966/67) (fig 8) are 
expressed through a photograph where the artist acts out a somewhat childlike 
activity. The action of squirting water from one’s mouth is reminiscent of a child playing 
in the bathtub, juvenile perhaps, but a behaviour that is relatable for the viewer. The 
title, Self-Portrait as a Fountain (1966//67) (fig 8), directly refers to Nauman’s intention 
for this to be seen as art, as self-portraits are by definition artworks, yet the action is 
one of ‘non-art’. The artwork is also reminiscent of fountains that are located in city 
squares, often containing sculptural elements and figures where water continuously 
flows from orifices in the sculpted bodies, such as in the Fontana di Trevi (1732) (Fig 
10). If the viewer is initially confused by the presentation of the idea (of the artist as a 
fountain), perhaps Nauman has succeeded in his intention. However, there is enough 
information to beguile the viewer’s thinking about the image presented, despite the 
initial absurd experience.  
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The intrigue for understanding or to make meaning of an event is in the nature of 
humankind. In Sartre’s (2001:3) words, “man [sic] first of all exists, encounters himself, 
surges up in the world—and defines himself afterwards”. Nauman’s self-exploration, 
and that of his non-art activity in the studio is a critical reflection of the artist’s body that 
has to produce art. One could perceive it as a sensible response to a non-sensible 
condition of the artist as the source of creative outpouring. These are fundamental 
catalysts that allowed Nauman to continue working in ways that are true to his 
phenomenological practices. 
 
3.2. ABSURDITY IN NAUMAN 
 
In The True Artist, Peter Plagens (2014:66) states that Nauman “knew that an object, 
in fact, loses much of its power if [pretending to look] like something else, i.e., having 
visual expression or implied visual referents, doesn’t really matter”. Danto (1981:111) 
claims that “whatever we are to say about aesthetic responses, it is possible to 
imagine that works with a common material counterpart elicit very different responses”. 
If one agrees with Plagens and Danto, when referring to the qualitative distinction 
between ordinary objects and their counterpart art objects, the difference comes with 
the appropriation of the object into an art context. The same argument can be made 
for the artist when the artist becomes the object appropriated into the artwork. The 
qualities are different when the artist becomes an artwork from when the artist is not 
an artwork. Yet the artist is always an artist whether in the artwork or not, or in the 
studio or not. Nauman (2014:72) explains this comparison when he states, “If you see 
yourself as an artist and you function in a studio you sit in a chair or pace around. And 
then the question goes back to what is art? And art is what an artist does, just sitting 
around the studio”. It is a back and forth that has no reasoning within itself. Imagine a 
47 
 
text that says, “This is true →” that points to a text that says, “← That’s a lie” that 
points back at “This is true→”. It is a true contradiction, in a sense a dialetheia (Priest 
& Berto 2013).15 
 
It can be argued that Nauman’s The True Artist is an Amazing Luminous Fountain 
(Window or Wall Shade) (1966) (fig 1), refers to Tristin Tzara’s Dada Manifesto 
(2003:4) which states, “to strip one's church of every useless and unwieldy accessory; 
to spew out like a luminous cascade any offensive or loving thought, or to cherish it - 
with the lively satisfaction that it's all precisely the same thing”. I argue that Nauman’s 
oeuvre endorses the same attitudes. 
 
The True Artist is an Amazing Luminous Fountain (Window or Wall Shade) (1966) (fig 
1), consists of a large window or wall shade, resembling those hanging in shop 
windows with text advertising the shop’s latest product pricing. The words, ‘the true 
artist is an amazing luminous fountain’, are printed on the outer parameter of the 
shade on all four sides. Nauman is mimicking a Dadaist ideal in this artwork by placing 
the text on a window or wall shade, something that resembles an everyday object, 
unobtrusive and ordinary (Lewallen 2007:252). A mundane object exhibited in an art 
space suggests an elevation of that object to ‘high art’ elitism, but when adopting a 
Dadaist or Duchampian viewpoint, it simultaneously strips art of its status. In spite of 
the text alluding to modernist notions of the role of the ‘true artist’, the elitism is 
contradicted when placed on a seemingly arbitrary object that bears little importance to 
the preservation of high art inimitable/exclusive art standards. Nauman declares 
                                                          
15 For example, the liar paradox is the easiest of self-referencing paradoxes to understand. It is 
self-referencing because it is both true and false at the same time. If I were to state, “this 
statement is a lie”. A question is raised whether or not the statement is true. If the statement is 
true then it must be a lie, but if the statement is a lie then what has been stated must be true 
(Beall & Glansberg 2014). 
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himself a ‘true artist’ when he makes Self-Portrait as a Fountain (1966/67) (fig 8), 
because he creates an ironic parody by acting out what he claims in The True Artist is 
an Amazing Luminous Fountain (Window or Wall Shade) (1966) (fig 1), and 
furthermore blends the real and the fictitious when doing so. 
 
Failing to levitate in the studio (1966) (fig 9), a double-exposed black and white 
photograph of Nauman attempting to balance himself between two chairs is indicative 
of his satirical understanding of contradictory states in his practice. He fails, 
expectedly, at achieving something that is impossible to achieve in the first place, yet 
documenting the attempt and turning it into an artwork becomes necessary. Multiple 
absurdities are contained in this work. For example; Nauman’s approach to making art 
is the documentation of his own actions; and if considered from a traditional 
perspective, the preposterousness/incongruity of those actions. He claims to know 
what a ‘true artist’ must be and performs the actions of this ‘true artist’, but it fails to 
convince aesthetically and conceptually. Of course, this is precisely Nauman’s 
intention, an intention to fall short of the somewhat bold and abstract claims, because 
Nauman understands that they are in contradiction to his own ideas of an artist. 
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Titles in artworks act as pointers assisting the viewer with the reading of the work. In 
Self-Portrait as a Fountain (1966/67) (fig 8), an embodiment of meaning is in the title. 
Nauman titled a work A Rose Has No Teeth (1965) (fig 11), after a theoretical 
argument regarding rational as opposed to absurd propositions in Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophical Investigations (1953). The bronze plaque, curved to wrap around a tree 
and embossed with the words ‘A Rose Has No Teeth’ indicates how Nauman thinks 
about the relationship between the art object and language. For Wittgenstein, the 
statement is an absurd yet truthful one that needs no justification within itself. 
Wittgenstein (2010:223) says “[a] new-born child has no teeth. A goose has no teeth. 
A rose has no teeth. This last description at any rate – one would like to say – is 
obviously true!” A child has no teeth but will gain teeth as it grows. A goose has no 
teeth but can bite behaving as if it has teeth. Of course, a rose has no teeth and will 
not grow to have them at any point, nor does it behave as if it has teeth. By putting two 
unrelated subjects together, such as roses and teeth, the imagination may formulate 
images in the mind of the strangeness of the idea. It is not a false statement, but an 
Fig 11. Bruce Nauman, A Rose has no Teeth (1965) 
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absurd and provocative one nonetheless, and Nauman – through reference to 
Wittgenstein – pushes concepts “to the point where logic and language break down” 
(Lewallen 2007:42). Using the word ‘fountain’, whether to extract meaning from the 
readymade or to rid it of meaning, eludes to more than just the object presented.  
 
Nauman’s approach in the text based piece The True Artist is an Amazing Luminous 
Fountain (Window or Wall Shade) (1966) (fig 1), for example, holds enough interest 
and strangeness for a viewer to formulate images in her mind and question the 
statement. However, the statement falls victim to its own ludicrous associations 
causing a similar absurdity found in Wittgenstein’s (2010:223) statement “a rose has 
no teeth”. 
 
3.3 ABSURDITY IN THE FOUNTAIN 
 
Fountains have a long standing relationship with art (as discussed in section 2.2.1) 
and are symbolic of multiple idioms and ideas that extend far into archived 
understandings of the functionality and aesthetics of fountains. When Nauman decided 
to use a fountain to underpin his actions he also created links to the existent 
consciousness of other fountains found all over the world. The viewer, on encountering 
Self-Portrait as a Fountain (1966/67) (fig 8), may extract experiences and knowledge 
of other fountains in the reading of Nauman’s representation. The viewer would have a 
similar recollection of fountains on an encounter with Calder’s Mercury Fountain (1937) 
(fig 5), but there are enormous differences in the intentions of Calder and Nauman. 
The Mercury Fountain (1937) (fig 5) is using the fountain ironically as a symbol of 
death, not death in a general sense, but as stated earlier, specifically the deaths of the 
mine workers at the Almaden Mercury Mines (atlasobscura.com). Calder subverts the 
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fountain that traditionally symbolises life and converts it to a giver of death. Although 
ironic, it remains in the tradition of fountains in art. Self-Portrait as a Fountain 
(1966/67) (fig 8), on the other hand, subverts the symbolic nature of the fountain not 
by changing the substance moving through the fountain, but by changing the essence 
of the object that transports the life-giving water. Nauman’s body becomes the 
fountain, but the very meaning of ‘fountain’ is challenged, because it no longer needs 
to appear as a fountain or function as one traditionally. Yet in the case of Self-Portrait 
as a Fountain (1966/67) (fig 8) Nauman seems to mimic – and in a sense mock – the 
tradition of sculptural fountains of old, such as Fontana di Trevi (1732) (Fig 10). He is 
not forsaking all embodied meaning in ‘fountain’, but he is altering it, bestowing it with 
a re-embodiment to physically adopt the properties of ‘fountain’. Furthermore, the 
purpose of being the fountain is not simply to represent/signify a fountain, it is in all 
respects challenging a tradition of aesthetics in art.  
 
In 1973 Craig-Martin created An Oak Tree (1973) (fig 6). The artwork looks nothing 
like an oak tree and looks precisely like a glass of water on a glass shelf accompanied 
by a text (fig 7). According to the text (fig 7) of questions and answers that accompany 
the glass of water as part of the artwork, it is clearly and justifiably an oak tree. Also, it 
is not just any oak tree, but one specifically made by Craig-Martin. Sartre (2007:3) 
explains that if ‘existence precedes essence’ then humankind is free to choose their 
essence, the purpose of their existence. Craig-Martin explains in the text (fig 7) for An 
Oak Tree (1973) (fig 6) that just because the work appears as a glass of water, it does 
not change the fact that the artist altered its physical properties. Conceptually, Craig-
Martin chose to amend the essence of the already existing object. As Craig-Martin 
expresses in An Oak Tree (1973) (fig 6) Nauman continues to be a fountain until he 
decides to change that. 
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An Oak Tree (1973) (fig 6) is not that different to Fountain (1917) (fig 4) where 
Duchamp conceptually changed the properties of a urinal into an artwork, except that 
Craig-Martin philosophically justifies it (see fig 7). As Godfrey (1998:248) explains 
about An Oak Tree (1973) (fig 6) “the point was no longer to say something new, but 
rather to say it precisely”. It is a logical absurdity, as is a self-referencing paradox 
(dialetheia). It is both a glass of water and an oak tree at the same time. Nauman’s 
fountain qualities are preserved in the form of a photograph, even if he chooses to 
become something else. He is both an artist as a fountain and a fountain as an artist. It 
is a paradox that continuously repeats on itself16. Although not all fountains are absurd 
Nauman’s fountains are deliberately intentioned to be so, similarly as absurd as it is to 
try and justify what a ‘true artist’ is. 
 
In Self-Portrait as a Fountain (1966/67) (fig 8), Nauman reminding us of the original 
intention of Duchamp, that art is more about contemplation when confronted with an 
artwork than about whether or not we enjoy it on a mere aesthetic level. Duchamp was 
saying something about the fundamental ontology of art – in its paradoxical nature art 
should not be taken so seriously. For Nauman, the spitting of water from the mouth, 
like pissing into the urinal, is showing the artworld how absurd it is and does so by 
making his own fountain more peculiar. 
 
                                                          
16 The action of repeating oneself emerges later in Nauman’s practice when he revisits the 
fountains a number of times,  such as in Three Heads Fountain in 2005 and again in One 
Hundred Fish Fountain in 2005 (see http://mocoloco.com/one-hundred-fish-fountain for images 
of these fountains). In both cases Nauman does not physically take on the properties of a 
fountain but allows elements from his personal life and activities, outside of the studio to adopt 
fountain properties, such as relationships with friends or pleasant fishing experiences “as a 
child ,with his father, and later, with his Chigo friend and dealer, the late Donald Young” 
(Plagens 1994:212). 
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The absurd as a conceptual tool exists in the paradox most effectively when what is 
being made is simultaneously considered art and not art, or true and not true. Of The 
True Artist Is an Amazing Luminous Fountain (Window or Wall Shade) (1966) (fig 1), 
Nauman (2007:72) says “on the one hand I believe it… it’s true and not true at the 
same time. It depends on how you interpret it and how seriously you take yourself. For 
me it’s still a very strong thought”. Engaging conceptually with the fountain, adopting 
its inherent, historical and functional qualities, makes Nauman’s exploration of the 
artist’s role in art a bewildering experience for the viewer, reminding them of what 
Duchamp achieved fifty years earlier. 
 
In Self-Portrait as a Fountain (1966/7) (fig 8), Nauman immerses himself into the 
artwork not only because it is a self-portrait, himself being the subject, but also as the 
object of investigation, a fountain. As said in the introduction the action of spitting from 
the mouth seems immature and Nauman produces an action that is frivolous and 
institutes it as art. However, art is traditionally understood as something important – it 
is to be taken seriously. Here Nauman twists traditional ways of seeing and 
understanding art ever so slightly – he is, in all seriousness, making elements of art 
seem ironic and absurd. One of his approaches to this ‘twisting’ of traditions is 
eliminating the aesthetic qualities that had come to be expected in the art 
establishment, as I point out earlier in section 3.2 regarding Duchamp’s aesthetic 
choices. Through analysing Fountain (1917) (fig 4) and making comparisons between 
Duchamp and Nauman’s artworks I have demonstrated how the absurd, as a lens 
through which to view the world, becomes a critical approach to art. In this section of 
the dissertation, I have explained the value of contradictions (dialetheia) by comparing 
the works in discussion with Craig-Martin’s An Oak Tree (1973) (fig 6) and Mercury 
Fountain (1937) (fig 5) by Calder. The reflexive contemplation of the absurd is evident 
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in Nauman’s solicitation of language, deliberate application of contradictions, the 
existence of failure, and a disregard for a traditional aesthetic. 
 
In this chapter, I have shown how the absurd is a conceptual framework used by 
Nauman, particularly the absurd as theorised by existential philosophy. In this regard, I 
link Nauman’s conceptual approach to the theoretical arguments of Camus and Sartre 
(as discussed more comprehensively in Chapter Two). Indicating the mechanism 
through which the body becomes an absurd fountain or object in the context of art 
presents the incongruent reality that includes both absurdity and meaning. By simply 
presenting absurdity in life through art already proposes that we reflect on life. This 
questioning in itself is a meaningful act which is incongruent with the absurd. 
Therefore one can propose that the recurrence of the fountain in Nauman’s artworks, 
as ‘rethinking’, is simultaneously meaningful and a dialetheia. 
 
In the next chapter, I explore the notion/concept of the absurd as a lens through which 
to view the world. I will discuss my own work in that regard and make reference to 
Nauman and Duchamp to substantiate my comparisons. 
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CHAPTER 4: ALEX TRAPANI 
 
In this chapter, I investigate my own thoughts about art, and my reflection thereof 
relates to the conceptual stances that Nauman takes when making art. This 
dissertation is written in relation to my exhibition held in April 2016 titled Neither Art 
Nor Art.17 Both the exhibition and the dissertation investigate the existence of 
conundrums in conceptual engagements with art. My intention was to indicate that 
absurdities resulting from ambiguities and contradictions are the elements that 
connected the viewers to the artworks. As previously discussed Nauman’s Self-Portrait 
as a Fountain (1966-67) (fig 8) confronts Marcel Duchamp’s artworks, specifically as it 
pertains to the paradoxical spirit of art. As Nauman comments on Duchamp’s Fountain 
(1917) fig 4), so I comment on Nauman’s fountains. More specifically, I interrogate the 
artist’s worth as mediated by precarious recognition or by being perceived as making a 
contribution to the art establishment, and by extension, of life in general. In my 
exhibition, I reveal aspects of insecurity and a lack of self-confidence of the artist 
functioning within art and the world around me. This is in contrast to both Nauman and 
Duchamp’s ostensible persuasions of confidence, which appear to radiate from their 
artworks. 
 
Neither Art Nor Art (2016) appropriates the fountain as representative of the cyclical 
mentality of a productive, equitable, and sustainable system i.e. a system that has 
worked successfully for centuries. In this cyclical sense, a fountain reflects when art is 
being made about art and about behaviours within art. Art needs no justification for its 
existence; it just is, and the praxis itself is without consciousness, as is a fountain. 
What I mean by this is that art is part of the human condition but is not cognitive of its 
                                                          
17 UNISA Art Gallery, Pretoria 
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existence as I am of my own. It is not a being, but I am a being that exists within art – 
art is non-conscious, it is the artist that is perceived to possess consciousness therein. 
A fountain is also without consciousness. When I, as a conscious being, behave as a 
fountain I comment on this ‘non-conscious’ state. An artist has consciousness and 
choosing to behave as a non-conscious entity implies self-reflection and a paradoxical 
metaphor. Self-Portrait as a Fountain (1966/67) (fig 8) is reflective in that the subject 
(the artist) becomes the object (the fountain) and this self-containment implies 
sustainability because of the indicative actions. To support the claim that the fountain 
reflects repetitive behaviour, represents the body, and supports a worldview of the 
fundamentality of the absurd in art, I compare Nauman’s artworks discussed in 
Chapter 3 with my own. I indicate my viewpoints regarding the ‘true artist’ and my 
criticality towards social constructs and the art establishment.  
 
As indicated earlier, the fountain implies a containment of water. Water is a symbol of 
sustenance. It is imperative to our survival. Not only is water symbolic of cleansing and 
a life sustaining substance but, nonetheless, inanimate. Water is paradoxical in itself. It 
gives life, yet is only ‘alive’ when it is put into motion. However, water also has all the 
attributes to take life, for example in drowning. It too has no consciousness. Water is 
made animate through objects like fountains, and the fountain implies the longevity of 
life. Symbolically water can also be seen as the fluids that lubricate the behaviours and 
actions I choose to perform in my exhibition. Keeping these actions animated is 
significant in the nurturing of art and, paradoxically, the activities I express can also 
imply ‘drowning’, such as being engulfed, submerged, and water-logged– the demise 
of the artist. 
 
57 
 
In the case of Neither Art Nor Art (2016) movement is cyclical, which is integral to the 
sustainability of a significant art practice. I refer to Sartre, Camus, and Wittgenstein to 
substantiate the applications of the absurd as discussed in Chapter Two. The 
conscious choice to behave un-consciously and repetitively in video performances is 
seemingly superfluous. The application of apparent arbitrary conceptual choices is 
discussed in the context of the absurd. When Nauman adopted the window or wall 
shade to express that ‘the true artist is an amazing luminous fountain’ he chose 
quotidian object to do so. Introducing subjects into the artworks that are not usually 
considered relevant to art but are executed as if they were worthy of art bestrides the 
valuable and the insignificant. In some of the performances where I work exeptionally 
hard at nothing important (fig 13) also straddles this line between relevance and 
purposelessness, and is indicative of the lengths to which the artist might go to 
establish a sense of prodigiousness in the artworld. In the context of absurdity, I 
consider such applications as a conceptual practice that contemplates the body as 
incongruous: the body of the artist as a ‘useless’ subject/object to society, and yet the 
creative intellectual body of the artist as a life-sustaining critic giving meaning to the 
everyday existence through the absurd. 
 
4.1 TRAPANI IN CONTEXT 
4.1.1 Behaviour, memory and misunderstanding 
 
My art reflects what I think about the world and how I behave in the world, i.e. my 
“being-in-the-world” (Sartre 1943:331, Heidegger 1953:39). Thinking influences 
behaviour and since I see art as a way of being, my praxis embodies a critical 
investigation of my own behaviour. As a result, I embody a subversive temperament, 
often toward my own behaviour within the context of society and the art establishment. 
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This subversive disposition is embedded in the absurd as a means of investigation. 
The results are records of the familiar, yet the activities captured or projected are 
incongruous. Neither Art Nor Art (2016) explores aspects of human nature as it 
pertains to finding meaning in achievement and significance in the day to day living, 
most specifically in art. Efforts to establish purpose in life affirms a sense of 
worthiness. However it is often accompanied with a level of absurdity in behaviour 
when reflected upon (Sartre 1938:21-23). 
 
Art of a conceptual nature holds relevance in a contemporary context not because it is 
logically justifiable or holds rationality, but because it is a reflection of the peculiarity of 
existence. Godfrey (1998:387) states that “conceptual art is most fruitful when 
conscious of its own contradictions” making it aware of the fallibility of art and the 
artist. An artwork in its full realisation exists, regardless of whether or not it is 
understood. A paradox is found because even if I misunderstand the reason an 
artwork occurs it still exists, but it exists in my misunderstanding. Proximity to an 
artwork does not immediately reveal the value it may hold, but it may inspire memory 
in the viewer. The artwork then holds significance to a personal memory experience 
and therefore has potential value. In this dissertation (Section 2.3.2) The Great 
Subterranean Pool of the Subconscious by Jason Funderburk (2009:25) has been 
explained in relation to Freud’s psychoanalytical theories with specific reference to 
what lies in the deepest subconscious mind that reveals itself occasionally through a 
reader’s interpretation of texts (artworks). The interpretation occurs in order to 
“discover the reality and truth behind the vagueness of words and ideas” (Funderburk 
2009:2). It is the ‘reality and truth’ (of the interpretation) where value is elicited. In this 
manner, I begin to observe, assess, analyse and understand meaning in artworks. I 
may attach importance to existing things in proximity to artworks that I have observed 
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previously, and vice versa. My own work and process of working have fundamental 
implications because I conceive it and bring it to fruition, but different artworks have 
different kinds of connotations. Some artworks hold a worth that is connected to the 
commitment to laboured execution (for example in Cutting Corners [fig 13]), or are 
substantial because of to the lack of work involved – as in cases where value is 
attributed to inspiration or craftsmanship (for example in Self-Wetting Portrait [fig 22]). 
Other artworks carry significance because they have a popular aesthetic appeal, or 
they have been desaturated of aesthetic familiarities, those having an alternative 
aesthetic appeal (Danto 2005:194-195) (for example Plinth [fig 23]). I attach 
prominence to the absurd and to that which subverts intended social expectation. I 
have consummation in the misunderstanding of things, because they allow for different 
ways of observing the world. Attaching meaning to other artworks because of the way I 
think about them, and not because of their intended meaning, can elicit differences in 
attachments of appraisal. I understand through the appreciation of artists such as 
Duchamp and Nauman that an artwork need not have a conceptual justification rooted 
in logic or popular aesthetic appeal. The contradiction is that some artworks can be 
rationalised but do not have to fit the rational world. 
 
Furthermore, in text-based artworks, or in the title of some artworks, such as The True 
Artist is an Amazing Luminous Fountain (Window or Wall Shade) (1966) (fig 1), 
Nauman sets up the ambiguity from the start. As discussed in Chapter Three, the 
ludicrous nature of the statement, ‘the true artist is an amazing luminous fountain’ 
embedded in the artwork surfaces when the viewer starts to question the purpose of 
the piece. The title holds clues as to how the viewer can investigate the work in 
relation to what is presented in the physical. Asking questions about the meaning of 
the work may send the viewer in the direction of thought (logical or illogical), leading 
60 
 
them back to the source, the text. Wittgenstein (2010:48) argues that in grasping “the 
essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in 
this way in the language-game which is its original home? – what we do is to bring 
words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use”. The viewer is left with a 
sense that there is more to the piece than can be interpreted in a single viewing, but 
perhaps will never be fully understood despite repeated viewings and the return to the 
essence of words, in the title of an artwork, for example. Regardless of the text 
accompanying Craig-Martin’s An Oak Tree (1973) (fig 6) that philosophically justifies 
the artist's intentions, expecting a complete understanding of the artwork is unlikely. 
‘To say it precisely’ does not guarantee a precise reading (Godfrey (1998:248). 
 
4.1.2 Significance, failing and avoidance 
 
In a video performance, Ascending and Descending (2016) (fig 12), the artist climbs 
up and down each side of a plinth repeatedly. This Sisyphean act is a comment on the 
artist’s ‘worthiness’ or ‘lowliness’ within the art establishment (and the world). The 
behaviour is indicative of the lengths to which the artist will go in order to gain 
significance in the artworld. However, every ascent is followed by descent. An 
interrogation of the artist's significance is at play which asks the question whether the 
artist's aspirations and dedication or the levels of exposed fallibility and desperate 
repetitions are responsible for achievements of notoriety. 
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Climbing up and down the plinth is a metaphor for the artist’s successes and failures, 
how he can at times be on the ascent or descent in his career. It is a personal 
reflection on my own career as an artist. In practice trials and errors become key 
methods in creating an artwork. Testing things and seeing if they are equitable or not 
is an essential part of the process. Often reflections on failed experiments become key 
elements in the creative process, and these lead to establishing an artistic purpose. 
Sartre reminds us in Nausea (1938:89) that purpose is chosen and assigning one’s will 
to it is all that can be done. Documenting failures is perhaps a way of coping with 
existential disappointment, despite knowing that failure is non-optional, such as in 
Nauman’s Failing to Levitate in the Studio (1966) (fig 9). Camus (1991:7) states that 
suicide (giving up) is not an answer to this dilemma as we are presented with the 
opportunity to make our purposes count for something, simply because we find 
Fig 12. Ascending and Descending, (2016) 
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ourselves in existence. As Sisyphus found harmony with the rock – his symbol of his 
own failures – so I can find harmony with art (Camus 1955:78). 
 
 
 
 
 
In the photographic print, (over)look (under)stand (2016) (fig 13), failure as a 
conceptual element is evident from an early encounter with it. The deliberation of the 
inverted photograph hopes to trick the viewer into believing that the artist is performing 
this activity upside-down, but very quickly fails to convince. The artist’s entire body 
grasps the plinth as if his survival depends on it. Being immersed in the investigation 
of art (as the plinth is a symbol of art) the artist is focused on the task at hand, but 
clearly unobservant of the world around him as his head is immersed in the plinth. A 
sense of avoidance is present, but more so a sense of solipsism18 is implied giving the 
                                                          
18 The Merriam Webster Dictionary describes Solipsism as “a theory holding that the self can 
know nothing but its own modifications and that the self is the only existent thing; also: extreme 
Fig 13. Alex Trapani, (over)look (under)stand (2016) 
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impression that understanding the commitment to the selected task is truly significant 
to the artist, yet what the actual task is remains undefined (within the parameters of 
art) rendering the efforts to hold on to the plinth self-indulgent and pointless. The work, 
therefore, can be interpreted as a critique of the character of the artist and art as an 
institution, not unlike Duchamp’s critique of the artworld via Fountain (1917) (fig 4) 
(Godfrey 1998:31). Much like Duchamp's artwork, evidence of the hand of the artist (in 
making) is absent, yet in (over)look (under)stand (2016) (fig 12) the body of the artist is 
enacted as object in merger with (engulf by) another object, the plinth, which is the 
symbol of the artworld. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
egocentrism” (www.merriam-webster.com, Sv “solipsism”). This more popular description 
implies that there is no external observations of the world and understanding is only allowed by 
introspection. On the other hand the cognitive scientist Jerry Fodor (1987) suggests about 
Solipsism “that the content of beliefs is determined by what is in the agent's head, and not what 
is in the world” (Heath, 2015). 
Fig 14. Alex Trapani, (sub)merge (2016) 
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In (sub)merge (2016) (fig 14), the artist is present in the work consumed by elements 
that epitomise his art practice, perhaps in thinking about the symbol of the plinth. The 
absorption becomes a meditation expelling the outside world (or the artworld), yet, 
paradoxically, the artist appears to be hiding, like a child who believes she cannot be 
seen by merely placing her hands over her eyes. Also, a sense of disgrace is evident 
as if the artist were trying to disappear into his own conceptions of art out of sheer 
discomfort – submerging his head in water to escape the world. In the case of 
(sub)merge (2016) (fig 14), the fact that the artist is doing things with his eyes closed is 
at once hubristic and shameful for him. The artist is focused but disabled by his own 
focus, engrossed in his practice while trapped by its limitations. 
 
When Nauman created Failing to Levitate in the Studio (1966) (fig 9) the activity was 
doomed to fail from the start, yet remained significant for the artist to attempt. Here 
Nauman reveals the ‘trick’ up front by showing the chairs that he tried balancing on to 
imply levitation. In (over)look (under)stand (2016) the selection of words are not as 
deliberate as Nauman’s in Failing to Levitate in the Studio (1966) (fig 9), but rather 
play a word game that emphasises the paradoxical nature of the artwork. To ‘overlook’ 
something implies observation, to inspect, manage or supervise a situation – to 
oversee. Paradoxically, if I ‘overlook’ something I have missed elements in 
observation, such as neglecting to use an ingredient in a cake recipe – I fail to see 
(merriam-webster.com Sv “overlook”). However, to ‘over-look’ could also imply looking 
at something for too long – an excessive looking that causes a failure to see 
accurately. ‘Over’ also shows the end of something – indicating the end of seeing 
altogether. To ‘understand’ also implies seeing – seeing things as they are. It is a ‘true’ 
observation. However, to ‘understand’ is more than seeing as it indicates a revelation 
of the nature of things – to grasp the meaning of things seen (merriam-webster.com Sv 
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“understand”). To ‘under-stand’ can simply imply standing under something – 
underneath – to be ‘under’ the rule of something as if supressed by it – standing in 
submission. A ‘stand’ also implies the plinth to which the artist clings, but by inversion, 
the plinth is no longer standing but rather hanging upside-down. The paradox of the 
work fails to reveal what its ‘true’ state is but reveals the artist is failing in the activities 
presented. 
In The True Artist is an Amazing Luminous Fountain (Window or Wall Shade) (1966), 
Nauman not only presents the viewer with the possibilities of unlocking the secrets of 
what a ‘true artist’ is but sets up an expectation of failure too, knowing that the 
discourse around what makes a ‘true artist’ is unending. In the inverse, the reality that 
Nauman points to is the impossibility to produce ‘truth’ at all, which is determined by 
the deliberate absence of an image. The significance thereof lies in the failure to 
produce the luminous fountain. Through the repetitive activity in Ascending and 
Descending (2016) (fig 12) the purpose of the artist becomes mundane and 
nonsensical. It can easily lose the viewer’s attention due to its banality, but potentially 
holds the viewer in observation because of the very pointlessness of the actions 
played out. Like Sisyphus, there is no longer a purpose beyond the activity itself. I 
have come to believe that the most significant thing in art is activity. The act of doing 
what an artist does results in art, but this does not warranty significance beyond the 
activity, nor does it guaranty expounding value. The paradox is that regardless of the 
importance and merit given to art practices post the existence of the art object; I will 
keep creating and thinking about what I create. 
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4.2 ABSURDITY IN TRAPANI 
 
 
 
 
In ‘Works of Art and Mere Real Things’, a chapter from The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace (1981), Danto (1981:5) discusses how actions in artworks can be 
voluntary but are complimented by the involuntary. Actions in artworks (particularly 
from performance based works) can be intentional, planned and choreographed for 
the purposes of the artwork, “[a]n action is a bodily movement that is covered by a 
rule” (Danto 1981:5). The deliberate action is accompanied by unintentional actions, 
such as ‘tics’ and ‘spasms’ (Danto 1981:5), and are too part of the artwork, regardless 
of their significance and irrespective of the presupposition to the artwork's existence. 
As Fountain (1917) (fig 4) does not make all urinals artworks, so too not all tics and 
spasms are artworks unless they have been so intentioned. A paradox emerges – the 
involuntary action is subsequently volunteered as art. What appears to be random 
behaviour is now analysed and justified as significant to the purposes of the artwork. 
 
 
Fig 15. Alex Trapani, 9 Desaturated Photographs (2016) 
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4.2.1  Random behaviour and reflection 
 
I can’t stop myself from thinking. At this very moment – it’s frightful – if I exist it is 
because I am horrified at existing. I am the one who pulls myself from the nothingness 
to which I aspire. Jean-Paul Sartre (Nausea 1936:99) 
 
In 9 Desaturated Photographs (2016) (fig 15) I exhibited a series of images, some of 
which are familiar to what has already been seen on Neither Art Nor Art (2016). Each 
photograph in the series captures a moment during performances by the artist. They 
are documents of activity, yet reveal little about the processes of those activities or the 
intentions of the artist. The connecting factors between the selected photographs are 
unclear, and it is as if they were randomly selected. A sense of a casual recall of the 
artist’s experiences during performances is presented as if they are a recollection of 
something one has seen before when observing something completely unrelated. I 
reveal a randomness that goes on in my conscious mind when attempting non-
conscious behaviour. Self-reflection is deemed irrelevant, but escaping it is not 
possible. In choosing images ‘at random’ I reflect on them and remember the 
behaviour, or how I felt during the activity – they are now ‘covered by a rule’ (Danto 
1981:5). I think about not thinking and therefore think about thinking. It is an 
inescapable loop. 
 
Thinking about behaviour influences behaviour. One's existence is confirmed as one 
reflects on personal re/actions, regardless of life's absurdities, modifying one's 
behaviour to achieve desired outcomes. “I am the one who pulls myself back from the 
nothingness to which I aspire” (Sartre 1936:99). As Nauman found himself thinking 
about what an artist does in the studio, I find myself thinking about what an artist does 
in the artwork. 
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4.2.2 The plinth, the art establishment and incessant duty 
 
A recurring object that appears in most of the artworks on Neither Art Nor Art (2016) is 
a plinth. The use of the plinth in my work is indicative of its practicality but raises 
conceptual awareness of its propagandistic nature and particularly in an art context 
where an object is elevated to a more practical viewing height. The plinth also acts as 
an archetype that epitomises the desire for accolades awarded for achievements, such 
as a stepped podium on a stage when a qualification is awarded, or a pedestal at a 
sports event for the receiving of a prize. It is indicative of its use in communicative or 
institutional constructs, such as in political debates, or religious services, and is 
purposed to elevate the speaker above the heads of the respective audience in order 
to be seen and heard more clearly. In my body of work the plinth becomes a symbol 
for the art establishment, how it ‘over’-sees the practitioners that stand-‘under’ its 
authority. 
 
The aspects of ‘over’ and ‘under’ are evident in Neither Up Nor Down (2016) (fig 16). 
The plinth symbolises the achievements or elevation of the artist, as seen in 
Ascending and Descending (2016) (fig 12). Here the plinth is precariously raised off 
the ground and emerges from the gallery wall as if it were one with the structure. The 
upside-down ladder is illuminated from inside the plinth and is no longer a mere 
functional object of ascent and descent – particularly due to its inversion atop the 
plinth – becoming an object of admiration. It is confounding in the sense that the 
ladder has been elevated by the plinth, yet it is denied its own ability to elevate. 
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In Section 6.54 of the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, Wittgenstein (2002:89) 
expresses the following about his propositions, which to him are the symbols we use to 
express our understanding of things in the surrounding world: “anyone who 
understands me eventually recognizes [my propositions] as nonsensical, when he [sic] 
has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw 
away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, 
and then he will see the world aright”. Wittgenstein’s very next point (point 7) in the 
Tractatus states, “what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence” 
(Wittgenstein 2002:89). In Neither Up Nor Down (2016) (fig 16) the nonsensical, or that 
of which ‘we cannot speak’ is the joining of propositions (by light) and are rather 
confronted with the idea of a conceptual regurgitation of the nonsensical rather than 
the discarding of the symbols of expression. There is a sense of endurance and 
Fig 16. Alex Trapani, Neither Up Nor Down (2016) 
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commitment to the surmounting of the nonsensical to be noticed by the art 
establishment regardless of succeeding in making sense thereof. 
 
 
 
 
 
Incessant duty to the art establishment becomes a form of submission to authority. 
Cutting Corners (2016) (fig 17) is a video performance that reveals aspects of 
incessant duty as the artist performs the difficult and somewhat destructive task of 
removing the four top corners of a plinth, the symbol of the art establishment. The 
activity of cutting corners to succeed in the artworld is contrasted with the sustained 
destructive efforts of the artist in achieving this goal, as if destroying the structures of 
authority that recognises the artist’s role, in order to further the recognition of the artist 
within the institution of art. A paradox exists between the path to success and the hard 
Fig 17. Alex Trapani, Cutting Corners (2016) 
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work in taking short cuts to get there. The determined behaviour of the artist, 
performed upon the chosen symbol, accentuates the duty of the artist to his craft and 
faithfulness to the establishment, regardless of the obvious discomfort. 
 
The plinth metaphorically affirms the aspirations associated with critical achievement 
and therefore serves as a structural representation of the prodigious character of art. 
As Sisyphus finds his purpose in incessant duty, the artist responds perpetually to an 
over-rationalised world through his tacit understanding. 
 
4.3 FOUNTAINS OF TRAPANI 
4.3.1 Sweat, piss and insecurity 
 
In Neither Art Nor Art (2016) the artist performs rudimentary idiomatic actions. The 
contrast between getting one’s feet wet – actively gaining some experience in art – 
and being wet behind the ears – being immature and inexperienced in art – is evident 
simultaneously, as in Wet Behind the Ears and Wet Feet (2016) (fig 18). The contrast 
of experience and inexperience accentuates the anxieties about the artist’s position in 
the practices of art. The artist is coqualified and unqualified in every new project 
embarked on. This can be bewildering for the artist and is conceptually continued 
through the discomfort of having pissed oneself in fear of failure or having wet feet in 
gaining experience in art. 
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When Duchamp’s Fountain (1917) (fig 4) is viewed, piss and the act of pissing must be 
imagined. The action is imagined by the object (urinal) represented in the artwork. 
When Nauman creates Self-portrait as a Fountain (1966/67) (fig 8), he clearly shows 
the action he takes in being a fountain represented in the photograph of Nauman 
spitting water from his mouth. For the well informed in art Nauman’s fountains can 
elicit memories of Fountain (1917) (fig 4). Therefore, it is not a difficult leap of the 
imagination to connect Nauman’s spitting to Duchamp’s pissing. In fact, because of 
the discourse existing about Self-Portrait as a Fountain (1966/67) (fig 8), it is not hard 
for the informed to associate my fountain pieces with Nauman’s or Duchamp’s, as is 
conceptually intended. 
  
Fig 18. Alex Trapani, Wet Behind the Ears and Wet Feet (2016) 
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Bearing reference to the odd yet common practice of an arm hanging outside the car 
window whilst driving, in Sweat Fountain (Driver’s Tan) (2016 (fig 19) the artist 
positions himself in art as if it were taking him on a journey. As the artist’s arm hangs 
outside of the plinth while appearing to be involved in nothing significant, in reality, the 
rest of his body is actively engaged in specific augmentation – as if I were driving a 
car. The involuntary ones accompany the voluntary actions, but it is as if the voluntary 
becomes involuntary. The artist’s arm, although flaccid, still sweats, not just from 
exertion, but also from the sun, like a light shining upon the extremity of the artist. The 
bucket represents attempts at preserving the by-product of involuntary labour so that it 
is not just left to dry up or evaporate. The result of working hard at nothing important is 
nonetheless contained significantly. 
 
Fig 19. Alex Trapani, Sweat Fountain (Driver’s Tan) (2016) 
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In many of Nauman’s video works in the 1960s, he acts out seemingly capricious 
behaviours physically exerting himself to achieve the desired outcome. For example, in 
Wall-Floor Positions (1968) (fig 20), Nauman uses his body to fill the space where the 
floor and the wall meet holding each position for forty-five seconds (Plagens 2014:26). 
Nauman’s Dance or Exercise on the Perimeter of a Square (Square Dance) (1968) (fig 
21) shows the artist engaged in choreographed movements for eight minutes and 
twenty-four seconds – there is no involuntary action here but the activities captured 
were experiments. The artist uses his body and documents the movements as “notes 
for future live performances” (Plagens 2014:70) capturing the physicality of the activity, 
working hard for reasons not commonly deductive in art. The behaviour is Sisyphean 
in nature. 
 
 
 
Fig 20. Bruce Nauman, Wall-Floor Positions (1968) 
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Fig 21. Bruce Nauman, Dance or Exercise on the Perimeter of a Square (Square Dance) (1968) 
Fig 22. Alex Trapani, Self-Wetting Portrait (2016) 
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In Self-Wetting Portrait (2016) (fig 22 and 23), is a small sculpted fountain embedded 
in the plinth. The bottom half of the artist’s body is reduced to approximately one tenth 
of its size (as if shrunken) and fitted with a fountain that overflows at the pants line. 
Impressions of pissing oneself out of nervous anxiety or fear of ridicule are apparent in 
the awkward partial self-portrait. Attention to anatomical correctness and surface detail 
is indicative of my commitment to my craft, and the down-scaling of forms and the 
body language shows insecurity and insignificance, the artist’s ‘smallness’ within the 
art establishment. The continuous flow of water accentuates the perpetual nature of 
the artist’s discomfort and uncertainty with being an artist, a type of perpetual pants-
wetting. The worthiness of the artist is interrogated here, and self-reflection reveals 
anxieties and self-doubt within the assumed expectations of the art establishment as if 
the establishment were keeping a watchful eye on the artist’s compliance. Like a 
Fig 23. Alex Trapani, Self-Wetting Portrait (detail) (2016) 
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fountain, the pursuit of recognition is cyclical no matter how precarious – yet again a 
Sisyphean behaviour. 
 
4.3.2  Language, the unsaid and double negatives 
 
When thinking about Wittgenstein’s (2002:89) expression “[w]hat we cannot speak 
about we must pass over in silence” in the context of the artist’s intentions it brings to 
mind that which the artist has chosen not to say. Just because Duchamp did not use 
the word ‘piss’ in Fountain (1917) (Fig 4) does not mean it cannot allude to urine. In 
6.522 of the Tractatus Wittgenstein (2002:89) claims “[t]here are, indeed, things that 
cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical”. 
 
Nauman conceived The True Artist Helps the World By Revealing Mystic Truths (1967) 
(fig 3) where the elements, the ‘true artist’, the ‘world’ and ‘mystic truths’, are set off 
against one another to give a sense of hope and hopelessness simultaneously. It 
becomes difficult for the viewer to remain silent about ‘what we cannot speak about’ 
(Wittgenstein 2002:89) because Nauman chooses to talk about that which continues to 
be undetermined and unanswerable. Nauman plays in a space where links between 
language and object are obvious yet nonsensical, such as in the statement ‘a rose has 
no teeth’ (Wittgenstein 2010:223). What Nauman does not say is what constitutes a 
‘true artist’, what constitutes ‘mystic truths’ and how they are revealed, and neither 
does he tell us how the world will be helped, which also links to Camus’ (1955:63) 
observation concerning the need for art. All of what is unsaid becomes more profound 
than what is said as if the unsaid or unseen is hiding away in plain sight. In (sub)merge 
(2016) (fig 14) the concept of the unseen is twofold: the artist fails at not being seen 
and simultaneously fails at seeing. Submerged in his own focus on investigation he 
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misses what is outside of himself. The open-ended evaluations suggest the artist 
hiding away from his own reality in spite of his investigations therein. 
 
A double negative, in essence, is that which negates its own conclusion, where two 
forms of negative are used in one statement. The double negative in the exhibition title 
Neither Art Nor Art (2016) insinuates that what you are seeing is about ‘not art’ and it is 
also about ‘non-art’, yet it remains about art. Regardless of how many negations the 
artworks use to justify the non-art nature of the exhibition, there is no escaping the 
paradigm of art or the overarching authority of the establishment. When you make 
non-art about art it is re-confined to art. I strive to escape the restraints of art but use 
art to do so. In my contemplations as an artist, I have not yet surrendered to the 
inevitability (or condemnation) of art as Sisyphus did to his duty of rolling the rock for 
eternity because I wish to resign from the ‘responsibilities’ forced upon me by the 
authority of the art establishment. Even resigning as an art practitioner and divorcing 
myself from the establishment has not worked in the past, because I have not 
succeeded in changing my ways of thinking. Like Sartre’s (Phillips 1981:23-31) waiter 
who dedicates his being to his purpose in serving the best way he possibly could 
whilst the nausea in realising that there is no preordained purpose to existence is 
overwhelming. The double negative as an artist is that I am both free to choose my 
purpose and condemned by that very choice I have made. 
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As stated in the introduction, the title of my dissertation, Bruce Nauman: The True 
Artist is an Absurd Fountain, is derived from The True Artist is an Amazing Luminous 
Fountain (Window or Wall Shade) (1966/67) (fig 1). The text is written in a rectangle in 
and around the frame for the wall-shade insinuating that there is no beginning and no 
end. It emphasises aspects of the cyclical nature of thinking and behaviour within the 
practices of art as well as under the authority of the art establishment. The plinth 
stands alone, white in a white space, in the artwork titled, Plinth (2016) (fig 24). There 
are almost no shadows presented, and the photograph insinuates that there is a light 
coming from the plinth itself as if it were glowing in its own presence. This piece 
becomes a beacon for the body of work as it attempts to monumentalise the symbol of 
the art establishment and its prodigious nature, yet in its solidarity, it becomes cold 
and lifeless without the interactions of the artist. 
 
Fig 24. Alex Trapani, Plinth (2016) 
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By investigating behaviours in art practices with a subversive temperament toward the 
art establishment, I expand on artistic activities by engaging with the object as symbols 
of expression, such as plinths, fountains (water) and my body, or parts thereof. By 
interacting with these objects in various ways, I attempted to affirm that my most basic 
engagements with objects have a place in art, regardless of the acceptance thereof by 
the establishment. By using art as a context in which to ‘act-out’ these banal 
engagements, I further subverted my own behaviours within the art establishment, 
affirming the nonsensical, and my own desires and aspirations for worthiness as an 
artist. The continued subversive cycle of the absurd as a legitimised art practice is 
what I aspire to, yet the research through practice and the literary research done within 
this dissertation simultaneously became a constructive investigation into the 
impossibility of research into the absurd, being absurd. Therefore the return to 
incongruity became a sensible answer indicative of the cyclical nature as represented 
through the fountain. 
 
At its most base level the word ‘true’, in the context of Nauman’s artworks, most 
commonly refers to the legitimate. The ‘true artist’ is actually the ‘legitimate artist’, 
which does not take away from the hermeneutical response that the statement 
conjures. In The True Artist is an Amazing Luminous Fountain (Window or Wall 
Shade) (1966/67) (fig 1), the artist is legitimised by the fact that he is a fountain, that 
he rises up, actively achieves, continues to behave selectively (or involuntarily), only to 
descend once more to repeat the process. The body of the artist behaves as an 
animated object that refreshes the point of view associated with existent artworks of a 
related conceptual embodiment. The very choice to behave incongruously is a 
conscious act, and the artist behaving as an unconscious object has an awareness of 
his actions, a true contradiction in terms, a dialetheia.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
In Chapter One under the heading The Research Problem, I discussed how the advent 
of conceptual art addressed the issue of ‘retinal pleasures’ (Danto 2007:1) where 
critical thinking started to surpass aesthetics. The found object became important in 
dealing with social issues and almost replaced the necessity of the laboured, well-
crafted art object. Documentation of implicit actions and bodily movements became a 
benchmark for representations in criticality and the understanding of art. Furthermore, I 
have studied, analysed and interpreted the demystification of the artist, a substantive 
notion in conceptual art. This is evident in Nauman’s artworks, as in Failing to Levitate 
in the Studio (1967) (fig 9), which reveals the fallibility of the artist. The role of the artist 
and specifically the artist’s body re-contextualised as a quotidian object, and the 
overlooked mundane action of our day to day existence has now become pertinent as 
a critical comment on society. 
 
5.1 VALIDATING THE ABSURD AS A FOUNTAIN 
 
The research question pertaining to Nauman’s criticality towards social constructs and 
the art establishment was investigated by comparing Self-Portrait as a Fountain 
(1966/67) (fig 8) to Duchamp’s Fountain (1917) (fig 4) and other artists’ works; 
Calder’s Mercury Fountain (1937) (fig 5); and Craig-Martins’s An Oak Tree (1973) (fig 
6); and defends the rationalisation of the absurd as a conceptual device. Therefore, 
the aim to examine influences on Nauman was also addressed by searching beyond 
art. Wittgenstein's absurdity directed Nauman in language, and his influence is clearly 
visible in A Rose has no Teeth (1965) (fig 11), which jests with the structural 
applications of propositions in language. Justifying the absurd as a legitimate method 
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in art, The True Artist is an Amazing Luminous Fountain (Window or Wall Shade) 
(1966/67) (fig 1), interrogates the provocative aspects of language where it gets 
pushed to its limits by remaining rational but simultaneously incongruent (Wittgenstein 
1961:76). 
 
Further consideration of the absurd was made in Chapter Two by referring to Camus 
and Sartre’s validations that human existence is essentially absurd (Sartre 1938:21-
23). The absurd is poignant in that it cannot be avoided and should operate as a 
catalyst to choosing one’s purpose, a point of departure (Camus 1991:8). This 
dissertation referred to Camus’ (1955:63) view that art would not be needed if our 
reality was lucid, which implies that it becomes necessary for art to address the 
meaninglessness of existence. It is not unreasonable for an artist therefore to express 
insecurities and the ‘nausea’ that accompany existential realisation (Sartre 1938:66). 
During this study I have ascertained that, like a neurological network reaching the 
extremities of a body, the absurd runs throughout Nauman’s practice. It lies as a 
conceptual structure embodied in the artworks and surfaces (and resurfaces) at 
moments to reveal the nausea of a purposeless endeavour in art. As explored in this 
dissertation appropriating himself, an artist as an object (mimicking the fountain), 
mediates Nauman’s criticality towards the artist, the art establishment, and, by 
extension, human existence. Attention was drawn to the fact that the fountain 
becomes the point of reference for repetitious and banal behaviour echoing the 
absurdity of our existence and practices in art. In this context, the ‘true artist’ is self-
made, as “truth is made rather than found” (Rorty 1989:7) 
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5.2 SIGNIFICANCE AND EMERGENT MEANING 
 
I have concerned myself with what the artist does in the establishment of art reflecting 
what Nauman has done in response to Duchamp, who critically retorted the artworld. 
Unlike Nauman, I use traditional ‘artistic’ skills in conjunction with more contemporary 
skills, such as performance videos. By doing this, I do not subtract from the notion that 
an artist is always an artist regardless of whether or not he is in the studio (or not 
making art outside of the studio). Being an artist is a way of being and not only justified 
by artistic activity. What the combining of traditional and non-traditional approaches 
does is compound the insecurities surrounding the significance of the artist under the 
authority of the establishment. Thus art and the artist are incongruent yet analogous in 
that the activities I perform as an artist, under the authority of the art establishment, 
are merely self-referencing paradoxes. However, this expanded the research question 
that reached for conclusive arguments that my own work could be ‘true’, yet 
perplexing, concurrently. My creative exploration of the body tapped into the tacit 
knowledge of artistic thinking as a well of understanding. By simultaneously using the 
body as an object, as a thinking medium and a theoretical construct, this research 
captured in writing and artmaking my search for absurd truths. The documented 
enactments of the body that mimic the activity of a fountain mirror Freud’s (2009:22) 
argument about truth in texts that the subconscious mind is like a subterraneous pool 
that springs forth memories and experiences into the conscious mind. The fountain 
fulfils the metaphor of a non-conscious, yet active – thereby repetitive – and therefore 
absurd truth. It is thus not conceited, nor is it fallacious to refer to myself as a ‘true 
artist’ and an ‘absurd fountain’ – as Nauman is a ‘true artist’ and an ‘absurd fountain’ 
as defined in the context of this dissertation. 
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Through this research and the investigation into Nauman’s artworks and practice I 
have gained insights into my own artmaking. Firstly, my approach to art is embedded 
in a fundamental absurdity, as I have come to the understanding that the search for a 
personal truth as an artist can be established on a foundation of the absurd. 
Furthermore, this foundation later allows for the viewer to be free of the want for logical 
justification in the engagement of my works. Meaning is made by the viewer and, as 
previously stated in section 1.2, when Danto (2005:11) claims that “the replacement of 
an aesthetics of forms with an aesthetics of meaning” suggests that the responsibility 
to make meaning moves to the viewer rather than coming from the artist. 
 
Secondly, by investigating Nauman, a realisation that a search for a truth is necessary 
for a continuation of an art practice, but it becomes superfluous to discover it. In fact, 
the search for truth is an absurd endeavour, and therefore the absurd is a truth. 
Existentially speaking, applying a conceptual framework of the absurd is a truthful 
action, as I have come to understand from Nauman’s work. Duchamp applied 
absurdity in Fountain (1917) (fig 4) which opened the perpetual debate of the 
constitutions of art and the institutionalisation thereof. In Self-portrait as a Fountain 
(1966/67) (fig 8), Nauman similarly engaged with the absurd questioning what 
comprises an artwork and the role of the ‘true artist’ therein. In response to Nauman 
and Duchamp, and through further use of the fountain, I attempted to engage with the 
absurd, in order to legitimize it as a conceptual device in art. The absurd therefore 
reflects itself in the end result of the artwork completing a cycle of truth, creating in the 
meaning of art, as well as in the actions of the artist, a true contradiction. 
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5.3 PROPOSED FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
There are research limitations due to demands for the requirements of setting specific 
boundaries in any dissertation. Issues arising regarding the hypotheses of: success as 
an artist; significance; art and non-art; and the paradox; are only touched on here and 
can supplement additional investigations. The potential for further research was 
particularly realised when my practice revealed the fragility of my body as a tool to 
think about the artist’s Sisyphean task of social critique (Camus 1955:75; Marshall 
2000:2). 
 
The study can be extended with comparisons between the absurd and my search for 
purgatory meaning as a conceptual framework. Investigating specifically South African 
artists and their views on obtaining success within the art establishment could reveal 
true contradictions. Furthermore, such dialetheism and the self-referencing paradox 
can be interrogated for innovative material application to expand the language of the 
artist. 
 
The cyclical subversion of absurdity itself holds the potential for artistic doubt to 
produce a recurrent resourceful fountain in art. If truth can reside in the absurd and the 
artist legitimized by repeated activity and the applications of the absurd as a 
conceptual device, then it can be acceptable to state that a true artist is an absurd 
fountain. 
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artist’s statement 
2016
Thinking about behaviour influences behaviour. One’s existence is confirmed as one reflects on 
personal re/actions, regardless of life’s absurdities, modifying one’s behaviour to achieve desired 
outcomes.
Bruce Nauman’s work both affirms and ridicules these ideas. He contended that being an artist 
and being in the studio, concludes that everything done there must be art (Plagens, 2014:72). 
Since I believe that art is a way of being my praxis interrogates and reflects on Nauman’s critical 
engagement with mundane human behaviour and with the art establishment, or what George 
Dickie (1974:31) refers to as the “artwold”. Therefore, my work presented here embodies this critical 
investigation of human nature by means of a subversive temperament.
Nauman’s Self-Portrait as a Fountain, (1966-67) confronts Marcel Duchamp’s works, specifically as 
it pertains to the paradoxical spirit of art. As Nauman comments on Duchamp’s Fountain (1917), so 
I comment on Nauman’s fountains. More specifically, I interrogate the artist’s worth as mediated 
by critical recognition or by making a significant contribution to life.
This exhibition concerns the fountain as representative of the cyclical mentality of a productive, 
equitable and sustainable system. When I, as a conscious being, behave as a fountain I comment 
on what it means to be an artist as an art object. It is as if involuntary behaviour, like that of a 
cascading fountain, subverts a rational existence and purpose in art.
The plinth metaphorically affirms the aspirations associated with critical achievement. Furthermore, 
a plinth serves as a structural representation of the prodigious character of art. My engagement 
mirrors my personal aspirations. These aspirations may appear involuntary or unanticipated, but 
since I need to make sense of a chosen resolve, the pursuit continues regardless. As Sisyphus finds 
his purpose in incessant duty when forced for eternity to roll a rock up a hill (Camus, 1955:7), so the 
artist responds perpetually to an over-rationalised world through his tacit understanding.
In order to be a true artist I strive to be an absurd fountain. 
I can’t stop myself from thinking. At this very moment – it’s 
frightful – if I exist it is because I am horrified at existing. I am 
the one who pulls myself from the nothingness to which I aspire. 
Jean-Paul Sartre (Nausea 1936:99)
1 2
fig. 2
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ascending and descending
stills from video performance
2016
In a video performance, ascending and descending (fig. 3, 4 and 5) the artist climbs up and down 
each side of a plinth repeatedly. This Sisyphean act is a comment on the artist’s ‘worthiness’ or 
‘lowliness’ within the art establishment (and the world). The behaviour is indicative of the lengths 
to which the artist will go in order to gain significance in the artworld. However, every ascent 
is followed by a descent. An interrogation of the artist’s significance is at play which asks the 
question whether the artist’s aspirations and dedication, or the levels of exposed fallibility and 
desperate repetitions are responsible for achievements or notoriety. 
3 4
fig. 3, 4 & 5
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6cutting corners
stills from video performance
2016
Incessant duty to the art establishment becomes a form of submission to an authority. cutting 
corners (fig. 6, 7 and 8) is a video performance that reveals aspects of incessant duty as the 
artist performs the difficult and somewhat destructive task of removing the four top corners of 
a plinth, the symbol of the art establishment. The activity of cutting corners to succeed in the 
artworld is contrasted with the sustained destructive efforts of the artist in achieving this goal, 
as if destroying the structures of authority that recognises the artist’s role, in order to further 
the recognition of the artist within the institution of art. A paradox exists between the path to 
success, hard work and taking short cuts to get there. The determined behaviour of the artist, 
performed upon the chosen symbol, accentuates the duty of the artist to his craft and faithfulness 
to the establishment, regardless of the obvious discomfort. 
5
fig. 6, 7 & 8
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wet behind the ears and wet feet
stills from video performance
2016
The artist performs rudimentary idiomatic actions. The contrast between getting one’s feet wet 
– actively gaining some experience in art – and being wet behind the ears – being immature and 
inexperienced in art – is evident simultaneously, as in wet behind the ears and wet feet (fig. 9). 
The contrast of experience and inexperience accentuates the anxieties about the artist’s position 
in the practices of art. The artist is concurrently qualified and unqualified in every new project 
embarked on. This can be bewildering for the artist and is conceptually continued through the 
discomfort of having pissed oneself in fear of failure, or having wet feet in gaining experience in 
art.  
7
water falls and water ascends
stills from video performance
2016
The artist is contrasted with a moving ladder. The close up shot of the artist’s mouth and beard, 
where water falls down beyond the picture frame, is indicative of the artist as an object that allows 
movement. The continuous flow of water represents the unceasing dedication to art, yet it has 
a sense of the unconscious action, such as the incessant drooling of someone in psychosis. The 
ladder, an instrument of ascent and descent, is denied part of its function as the water continues 
to climb. It represents the artist’s desire to never have to come down. 
8
fig. 9 fig. 10
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self-wetting portrait
mixed media fountain sculpture
2016
In self-wetting portrait (fig. 11 and 12), a small sculpted fountain embedded in the plinth, the 
bottom half of the artist’s body is reduced to approximately one tenth of its size (as if shrunken) 
and fitted with a fountain that overflows at the pants line. Impressions of pissing oneself out of 
nervous anxiety or fear of ridicule are apparent in the awkward partial self-portrait. Attention to 
anatomical correctness and surface detail is indicative of my commitment to my craft and the 
down-scaling of forms and the body language shows insecurity and insignificance, the artist’s 
‘smallness’ within the art establishment. The continuous flow of water accentuates the perpetual 
nature of the artist’s discomfort and uncertainty with being an artist, a type of perpetual pants-
wetting. The worthiness of the artist is interrogated here and self-reflection reveals anxieties 
and self-doubt within the assumed expectations of the art establishment, as if it were keeping a 
watchful eye on the artist’s compliance.
9 10
fig. 11 & 12
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neither up nor down
mixed media sculpture
2016
In neither up nor down (fig. 13 and 14) the plinth symbolises the achievements or elevation of 
the artist, as seen in ascending and descending (fig. 3, 4 and 5). Here the plinth is precariously 
raised off the ground and emerges from the gallery wall as if it were one with the structure. 
The upside-down ladder is illuminated from inside the plinth and is no longer a mere functional 
object of ascent and descent – particularly due to its inversion atop the plinth – becoming an 
object of admiration. It is confounding in the sense that the ladder has been elevated by the 
plinth yet it is denied its own ability to elevate.
12
fig. 13 & 14
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sweat fountain (driver’s tan)
mixed media sculpture
2016
Bearing reference to the odd yet common practice of an arm hanging outside the car window 
whilst driving, in sweat fountain (driver’s tan) (fig. 15 and 16) the artist positions himself in art 
as if it were taking him on a journey. As the artist’s arm hangs outside of the plinth, while 
appearing to be involved in nothing significant the viewer may imagine that the rest of his body is 
actively engaged in specific augmentation – as if he were driving a car. The voluntary actions are 
accompanied by the involuntary ones, but it is as if the voluntary becomes involuntary. The artist’s 
arm, although flaccid, still sweats, not just from exertion, but also from the ‘spotlight’ or ‘sunlight’ 
upon the hand. Here the bucket also cross references Duchamp’s fountain (1917).  Both the bucket 
and fountain (1917) become proverbial receptacles of bodily secretions. The result of working hard 
at nothing important is nonetheless contained significantly. 
13 14
fig. 15 & 16
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wet behind the ears II
mixed media fountain sculpture
2016
The enlarged ear of the artist appears as if swollen due to its prolonged exposure to water. The 
perpetual flow of water behind the ear suggests the continuous inexperience of the artist when 
facing the challenges of making art. The cycle of water flows away only to return, emulating the 
artist’s compulsion to make art.
16
fig. 17 & 18
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9 desaturated photographs
photographic print installation
2016
In 9 desaturated photographs (fig. 19), I exhibited a series of images, some of which are familiar 
to what has already been seen on neither art nor art. Each photograph captures a performance 
moment. Self-reflection is unavoidable and escaping it is impossible. In choosing images ‘at 
random’ I reflect on them and remember the behaviour, or how I felt during the activity. My 
recollections of activity imply the cyclical nature of contemplative thought and how thinking 
about behaviour alters behaviour, which leads to contemplation. fig. 19
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(over)look (under)stand
photographic print
2016
In (over)look (under)stand (fig. 20), failure as a conceptual element is evident from an early 
encounter with it. The deliberation of the inverted photograph hopes to trick the viewer into 
believing that the artist is performing this activity upside-down, but very quickly fails to convince. 
The artist’s entire body grasps the plinth as if his survival depends on it. Being immersed in the 
investigation of art  the artist is focused on the task at hand, but clearly detached from the world 
around him as his head is immersed in the plinth. A sense of avoidance is present, but more so 
a sense of solipsism is implied giving the impression that understanding the commitment to 
the selected task is truly significant to the artist, yet what the actual task is remains undefined 
(within the parameters of art) rendering the efforts to hold on to the plinth self-indulgent and 
pointless. The work therefore can be interpreted as a critique of the character of the artist and art 
as institution, not unlike Duchamp’s critique of the artworld via Fountain (1917) (Godfrey 1998:31). 
Much like Duchamp’s artwork evidence of the hand of the artist (in making) is absent, yet in (over)
look (under)stand (fig. 20) the body of the artist is enacted as object in merger with (engulfed by) 
another object, the plinth, which is the symbol of the artworld. 
20
fig. 20
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(sub)merge
photographic print
2016
In (sub)merge (fig. 21), the artist is present in the work consumed by elements that epitomise his 
art practice, such as the contemplation of the symbol of the plinth. The absorption becomes a 
meditation expelling the outside world (or the artworld), yet, paradoxically, the artist appears to 
be hiding, like a child who believes it cannot be seen by merely placing the hands over the eyes. 
Also, a sense of disgrace is evident as if the artist were trying to disappear into his own concep-
tions of art out of sheer discomfort – submerging his head in water to escape the world. In the 
case of (sub)merge (fig. 21) doing things with his eyes closed is at once hubristic and shameful 
for the artist. The artist is focused but disabled by his own focus, engrossed in his practice while 
trapped by its limitations.
21 22
fig. 21
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plinth
photographic print
2016
The plinth stands alone, white in a white space, in the artwork titled, plinth (fig. 22). There are 
almost no shadows presented and the photograph implies that there is a light coming from the 
plinth itself, as if it were glowing in its own presence. The plinth becomes a beacon for the body 
of work as it attempts to monumentalise the symbol of the art establishment and its prodigious 
nature, yet in its solidarity it becomes cold and lifeless without the interactions of the artist.
23 24
fig. 22
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If the world were clear, art would not exist.
(Albert Camus 1955:63)
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